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This Article considers how prominent goals of natural resources law
and the prevailing model of regulatory decision making combine to
limit the capacity of natural resources governance to manage the effects
of climate change. The Article explores the implications of continuing
to rely on conventionally static and fragmented decision making,
passive management, and historical preservation when global climatic
shifts are widely expected to lead to rapid changes in ecological systems
that are unforeseen, novel, and potentially detrimental to ecological
diversity and function. This emphasis of natural resources management
on stasis arises from the legal system’s discomfort with integrating and
managing uncertainty and change. As an accelerant, climate change
makes this rigidity particularly evident and unsustainable. The Article
ultimately argues for the need to change both the means and the ends of
natural resources law to better deal with change and uncertainty, as
well as inform and galvanize public deliberation on natural resource
decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
Existing natural resources law in the United States is poorly
suited to foster effective human and ecological adaptation1 to the
effects of climate change on natural resources for two reasons—one
procedural, the other substantive. First, natural resource decisionmaking processes exhibit poor adaptive capacity because they are not
designed to incentivize intra-agency learning or to make use of
existing opportunities for interjurisdictional learning.2 As uncertainty
is one of the largest threats to natural resources management arising
from global climate change, most natural resources management

1. Unlike climate change mitigation strategies, which focus on how to minimize or
regulate greenhouse gas air emissions to prevent or reduce further climate change, climate
change adaptation strategies concentrate on how to manage and reduce the detrimental
climate change-related effects on natural and human systems. See WILLIAM E.
EASTERLING III ET AL., PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, COPING WITH
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ROLE OF ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, at iii
(2004),
available
at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Adaptation.pdf;
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Appendix I: Glossary, in CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 869, 869 (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY]. As a result, they are fundamentally
different, but possibly complementary, enterprises. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE
RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 11
(2009), available at http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impactsreport.pdf (“Mitigation and adaptation are both essential parts of a comprehensive climate
change response strategy.”).
2. See infra Part I.
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authorities lack sufficient capacity to engage in meaningful climate
change adaptation planning.
Second, key preservationist goals of natural resources law
premised on historical preservation (the protection of resources or
landscapes in their historical condition) or passive management
(minimizing human involvement with nonhuman systems) will be
increasingly costly, difficult, and even impossible to meet.3 As the
most prominent federal example of historical preservation, the
National Parks Organic Act tethers the national park system to a
historical baseline with its central purpose of maintaining “the
scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein
. . . unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”4 The
fundamental mandate of the Wilderness Act, the primary federal
example of passive management, is the protection of areas “where the
earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man
himself is a visitor who does not remain.”5 By exerting increased
stress on already taxed ecosystems and causing or accelerating
fundamental ecological changes from prior conditions, climate change
makes the significant costs and ultimate unsuitability of the National
Parks Organic Act’s historical preservation and the Wilderness Act’s
passive management goals particularly evident. Because it pits
historical preservation and passive management goals against each
other, and potentially against concerns for long-term ecological
function, climate change makes profound modification in natural
resources law essential.
The procedural and substantive limitations of natural resources
law are interrelated, as are the solutions to those limitations. Natural
resources law in the United States has traditionally emphasized static
models of nature (to what end should we manage natural systems)
and of decision making (how we learn and decide). The reliance of
natural resources management on static decision making on the one
hand, and passive management and historical preservation on the
other, depend on and reinforce each other. This emphasis on stasis
arises from the legal system’s traditional discomfort with integrating
and managing uncertainty and change. To address this, both the
means and ends of natural resources law and management must be
refashioned to better adapt to a dynamic world. This includes an
increased emphasis not on preserving the past or minimizing human
3. See infra Part II.
4. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
5. Id. § 1131(c).
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involvement, but rather on limiting bad interactions and promoting
the function of valuable ecological processes and constituents.
Because this substantive vision of natural resources management is
less expert-driven and scientific, it also emphasizes that natural
resources law’s core function should be improving the process of
natural resource decision making. This includes a regulatory process
premised on promoting stakeholder involvement, cultivating agency
and stakeholder learning, and reducing uncertainty over time. In
addition, the adaptive governance process recognizes that resource
management decisions, such as whether or not to introduce a species
into an area outside of its preexisting range, at their core are not only
technical, but in fact fundamentally normative or political.
This Article explores the relationship between these embedded
models of nature and decision making, and how these assumptions
limit the capacity of existing regulatory systems to manage the effects
of climate change on natural resources in the United States. Part I
explores how existing regulatory institutions are poorly suited to
foster effective natural resource adaptation because they are not
designed to cultivate systematic learning and manage uncertainty.
Part II explores the static view of nature enshrined in particular
substantive goals of natural resources law. In this context, it considers
the implications of the conservation movement’s emphasis on
historical preservation. Part III discusses the link between these two
static visions, how they are mutually reinforcing, and how the
solutions to their shortcomings are connected as well. Part IV
professes the need to change both the means and the ends of natural
resources law to better deal with change and uncertainty as well as
inform and galvanize public deliberation on natural resource
decisions.
I. THE WEAK ADAPTIVE CAPACITY OF NATURAL RESOURCE
PROCESSES
The biggest threat to natural resources management that
accompanies
climate
change
is
information
uncertainty.
Unfortunately, existing government institutions for managing natural
resources are not sufficiently designed to encourage the reduction
and management of uncertainty.6 Moreover, the current natural
resources regulatory system fails to take advantage of the significant
opportunities for interjurisdictional learning that exist.7 As a result,
6. See infra Part I.A.
7. See infra Part I.B.
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the existing framework for managing natural resources in the United
States lacks adequate capacity to develop effective strategies for
preparing for and weathering the current and future effects of climate
change.
A. Climate Change Adaptation and Uncertainty
Uncertainty is prevalent in environmental governance. In fact,
some scholars consider uncertainty to be a defining characteristic of
environmental problems.8 However, the uncertainty accompanying
climate change adaptation is of a different order of magnitude than
conventional environmental problems.
As alarming as the current and projected consequences from
anthropogenic climate change are, the primary concern of natural
resources law over the next several decades should not be the direct
ecological effects from climate change. There is considerable reliable
evidence that climate change is having (and will increasingly have)
substantial negative effects on ecological systems and processes.
Extensive scientific data indicates that climate change has caused
significant harm to wildlife, vegetation, and ecological processes,9
including biota in the United States.10 The effects on ecological and

8. JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 15 (3d ed. 2010) (“In many respects scientific uncertainty is the defining feature of
environmental policy.”); Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 494, 498–99 (2008); Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals
and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 208 (1978) (“Ignorance of mechanism is the first
characteristic of environmental risk problems.”) (emphasis omitted).
9. See, e.g., CAMILLE PARMESAN & HECTOR GALBRAITH, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE, OBSERVED IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE U.S. 17–34
(2004), available at www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/final_ObsImpact.pdf (reporting the
effects of climate change in the United States); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE
BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT
OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 2–5 (Susan Solomon et
al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS] (listing the human drivers of
climate change); Camille Parmesan, Ecological and Evolutionary Responses to Recent
Climate Change, 37 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY EVOLUTION & SYSTEMATICS 637, 639 (2006)
(“[T]he direct impacts of anthropogenic climate change have been documented on every
continent, in every ocean, and in most major taxonomic groups.”) (citations omitted);
Camille Parmesan & Gary Yohe, A Globally Coherent Fingerprint of Climate Change
Impacts Across Natural Systems, 421 NATURE 37, 41 (2003) (discussing the substantial
detrimental effects of climate change); Martin L. Parry et al., Summary for Policymakers,
in IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 1, at 7, 8–9 (listing observed
impacts of climate change on the natural and human environment); Boris Worm et al.,
Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosystem Services, 314 SCIENCE 787, 787–90
(2006) (discussing the effect of aquatic biodiversity loss on ocean ecosystems).
10. See, e.g., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INDICATORS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN
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human systems from projected future climate change are expected to
be substantially greater, with particular harm in the United States to
forest, coastal, and freshwater resources.11
Nonetheless, the exceptional uncertainty that exists for natural
resource adaptation efforts will likely be at least as significant a
barrier to functional management of the effects of climate change on
natural systems as these direct ecological effects themselves. The
projected breadth, severity, and speed of climate change threaten to
move many vital and productive ecosystems outside their range of
historical variability.12 Unfortunately, this unprecedented change not
CALIFORNIA, at ii–iii, 146–65 (Linda Mazur & Carmen Milanes eds., 2009), available at
http://www.oehha.ca.gov/multimedia/epic/pdf/ClimateChangeIndicatorsApril2009.pdf
(reporting decreased spring snowmelt, rising sea levels, increased frequency of wildfires,
accelerated wine grape blooming, and changes in bird, small mammal, and butterfly
migration patterns in California); THE H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR SCI., ECON. & THE
ENV’T, THE STATE OF THE NATION’S ECOSYSTEMS 2008: FOCUS ON CLIMATE CHANGE
2–4 (2008), available at http://www.heinzctr.org/ecosystems/2008report/pdf_files/
Climate_Fact_Sheet.pdf (summarizing indicators of climate change in the United States);
U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 27–40 (describing climate
change in the United States); Peter Backlund et al., Executive Summary, in THE EFFECTS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON AGRICULTURE, LAND RESOURCES, WATER RESOURCES, AND
BIODIVERSITY IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT BY THE U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE
SCIENCE PROGRAM AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH 1, 4–5
(Margaret Walsh ed., 2008) [hereinafter THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE], available
at http://www.sap43.ucar.edu/documents/SAP_4.3_6.18.pdf (exploring how changes in
climate exacerbate or ameliorate stresses on agriculture, land resources, water resources,
and biodiversity); Lisa Crozier, Warmer Winters Drive Butterfly Range Expansion by
Increasing Survivorship, 85 ECOLOGY 231, 239–40 (2004) (explaining the northward
movement of the sachem skipper butterfly range); Alan T. Hitch & Paul L. Leberg,
Breeding Distributions of North American Bird Species Moving North as a Result of
Climate Change, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 534, 534 (2007) (“As predicted, the
northern limit of birds with a southern distribution showed a significant shift northward
(2.35 km/year).”); David W. Inouye et al., Climate Change Is Affecting Altitudinal
Migrants and Hibernating Species, 97 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1630, 1632–33 (2000);
Parmesan, supra note 9, at 643–44 (noting the acceleration in bloom dates
(phytoplankton), flowering dates (flowers), calling dates (frogs), and spring events (birds)
for certain species); Monika Winder & Daniel E. Schindler, Climate Change Uncouples
Trophic Interactions in an Aquatic Ecosystem, 85 ECOLOGY 2100, 2102–05 (2004).
11. See PETER C. FRUMHOFF ET AL., THE NORTHEAST CLIMATE IMPACTS
ASSESSMENT, CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE U.S. NORTHEAST: SCIENCE,
IMPACTS, AND SOLUTIONS 47 (2007), available at http://www.climatechoices.org/assets/
documents/climatechoices/confronting-climate-change-in-the-u-s-northeast.pdf; David M.
Lawrence et al., Accelerated Arctic Land Warming and Permafrost Degradation During
Rapid Sea Ice Loss, 35 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L11506, at 5 (2008); Parry et al.,
supra note 9, at 10–12 (projecting with very high confidence increased harm to coastal and
freshwater resources); M.G. Ryan et al., Land Resources: Forests and Arid Lands, in THE
EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 10, at 75, 96–103 (projecting greater
disturbance to forests from fire, pestilence, and disease).
12. See, e.g., Parry et al., supra note 9, at 11 (“The resilience of many ecosystems is
likely to be exceeded this century.”); Frank J. Rahel et al., Managing Aquatic Species of
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only jeopardizes the fundamental resilience, and thus existence of,
these ecosystems,13 but also makes extrapolations from current
ecological knowledge of limited value. Furthermore, the global scale
of the problem, the inevitably limited study of the effects of climate
change,14 and the complex interaction between a host of climatic
variables15 raise considerable uncertainty for the development of
effective climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies.16
Yet climate change adaptation efforts face even greater
uncertainty than mitigation strategies. As compared to scientific
models of global climate temperatures and sea levels for developing
mitigation strategies, modeling for adaptation decisions requires the
additional step of “downscaling,” which takes global models and
attempts to project how such changes in global temperature will affect
local conditions and resources.17 For example, to project the effects of
climate change on a particular species, accurate models would need to
Conservation Concern in the Face of Climate Change and Invasive Species, 22
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 551, 557 (2008) (“Climate changes . . . may cause
environmental conditions to exceed the historic range of variability to which species are
adapted in a particular region.”).
13. See Parry et al., supra note 9, at 11; Stephen H. Schneider et al., Climate-Change
Scenarios for Impact Assessment, in GLOBAL WARMING AND BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
38, 53 (Robert L. Peters & Thomas L. Lovejoy eds., 1992).
14. See Parry et al., supra note 9, at 9 (“[A]vailable analyses are limited in the number
of systems and locations considered.”).
15. A number of features of climate dynamics remain difficult to predict and/or
poorly understood. Some features, such as melting permafrost, may lead to a vicious cycle
of warming, but the extent of these nonlinear effects is unclear. See Katey M. Walter et al.,
Methane Bubbling from Northern Lakes: Present and Future Contributions to the Global
Methane Budget, 365 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 1657, 1671 (2007). Similarly,
the influence of potentially confounding natural factors is unclear. See Richard A. Kerr,
Another Global Warming Icon Comes Under Attack, 317 SCIENCE 28, 28 (2007)
(considering how emitted aerosols may counteract warming by deflecting solar radiation);
J. T. Randerson et al., The Impact of Boreal Forest Fire on Climate Warming, 314 SCIENCE
1130, 1130 (2006) (discussing evidence that increased forest fires may reduce temperatures
in the long term because of increased surface reflectivity). In addition, some climatic
features will likely be discovered only after additional climatic changes occur. Cf. J.B.
Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog
Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 19 (2008) (“[E]ven as we learn more about the highly coupled,
tightly interacting processes that comprise the climate, the likelihood is that we will realize
with even greater clarity that it is inherently unpredictable.”).
16. See Ruhl, supra note 15, at 22 (“[C]limate change does not present just another
disturbance regime, the operations of which we can extrapolate from current ecological
knowledge; rather, it will be the undoing of ecosystems as we know them.”); Joseph A.
Siegel, Collaborative Decision Making on Climate Change in the Federal Government, 27
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 257, 259 (2009).
17. See Climate and Land Use Change Effects on Ecological Resources in Three
Watersheds: A Synthesis Report, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,045, 45,046 (Aug. 10, 2007) (notice of
public comment).
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input (often nonexistent) data on the existing range and dispersal
characteristics of that species and other ecologically linked species,
and forecast how local climatic changes might shift such ranges when
combined with other dispersal barriers. Of course, the localized
impacts of climate change will vary greatly depending on the
adaptability of each ecosystem18 and many local nonclimate factors,
such as population shifts and income, existing land uses, technological
development, and invasive species.19 Many additional assumptions
beyond those for global modeling are necessary, and small changes in
these assumptions can lead to widely varying results.20 Consequently,
localized modeling of the effects of climate change remains much
more inchoate and less reliable than the modeling used to inform
decisions on mitigation.21 Of course, such uncertainty is amplified by
the fact that the effects of global climate change on ecosystems will be
influenced by two other factors for which there remains limited
information: the extent of mitigation strategies to be employed to
abate further climatic change22 and the collateral effects on biota from
adaptation strategies likely to be adopted to protect humandominated landscapes.23
Together these factors elevate uncertainty to an unprecedented
level,24 forcing scientists to reexamine or even discard conventional
assumptions and methods, and making regulators assess and manage
problems they have never faced before. In this uncertain regulatory
environment, natural resources governance must be primarily
concerned with maximizing natural resources institutions’ capacity to
18. See Parry et al., supra note 9, at 11.
19. See id. at 20.
20. See, e.g., DAVID C. BADER ET AL., U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM & THE
SUBCOMM. ON GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH, CLIMATE MODELS: AN ASSESSMENT OF
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS 88 (2008), available at www.sc.doe.gov/ober/sap3-1-finalall.pdf (“[M]aking different assumptions about the land biosphere within a single model
gave markedly different feedback values.”).
21. See Parry et al., supra note 9, at 9 (“[T]emperature variability is larger at the
regional than at the global scale . . . . [A]t the regional scale other factors (such as land-use
change, pollution, and invasive species) are influential.”); Susan Solomon et al., Technical
Summary, in THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 9, at 19, 74 boxTS.10 (“There
remain a number of important sources of uncertainty limiting the ability to project
regional climate change.”).
22. See EASTERLING ET AL., supra note 1, at iii.
23. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 9, at 3–4; Ruhl, supra
note 15, at 24–26 (explaining the secondary ecological and human adaptation effects of
climate change); Solomon et al., supra note 21, at 42–43.
24. See Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 14–15 (2009); Siegel,
supra note 16, at 266.
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assess, manage, and reduce uncertainty where possible. Accordingly,
though the development of substantive strategies for adapting natural
and human systems to the physical effects of climate change will be
vital, some of the most important strategies to facilitate effective
adaptation to the effects of climate change will be those that
encourage regulators and stakeholders to manage uncertainty
through learning. This includes generating and gathering information
about current and projected effects and past, existing, and potential
future management strategies, as well as promoting the integration of
such information throughout the regulatory and resource
management process.
B.

Existing Governance Hinders Effective Management of
Uncertainty

Unfortunately, the natural resources governance system in the
United States is poorly suited to foster effective natural resource
adaptation because it is not designed to foster learning. This is due to
two basic features. First, most natural resource programs do not
sufficiently encourage managers and regulators to learn, manage
uncertainty, or make management more effective at achieving
regulatory goals. Second, natural resources governance is generally
characterized by fragmented and largely uncoordinated authority that
is limited in its capacity to promote interjurisdictional information
sharing and collaboration that can help reduce uncertainty about both
the efficacy of management strategies and the effects of climate
change. Because it lacks a sufficient infrastructure for cultivating
learning and information sharing, the current federal system of
natural resources management has and will continue to have
considerable difficulty managing and reducing uncertainty.
1. Front-end, Static Government Decision Making
Most American natural resource programs are not designed to
manage uncertainty or reduce mistakes that are almost certain to
occur when facing unclear regulatory problems. Natural resources law
fails to encourage resource managers to systematically monitor25 and
adjust management decisions to make them more effective at

25. See Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. COLO. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 32–34) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(highlighting numerous obstacles, both internal and external, that agencies face in the
development of monitoring programs).
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achieving program goals.26 Even for more conventional
environmental problems, agencies inevitably have limited
information about the relevant environment and effects of proposed
actions. In this context, agencies regularly adopt strategies that
subsequent data may demonstrate are insufficient or for which
background conditions shift such that the strategy is no longer as
effective as previously expected.27
However, agencies are not required or encouraged to monitor
past decisions, adjust such decisions to reflect new information or
changed circumstances, or be more effective over time at achieving
regulatory goals. Though statutes and regulations routinely require
post-decision monitoring, and while agencies expressly acknowledge
the importance of accountability,28 agency attention to such directives
is notoriously deficient.29 Agencies rarely even assess whether prior
background assumptions were accurate or whether prior decisions are
actually achieving regulatory goals.30
Moreover, statutes and regulations do not require most agencies
to work with and reduce uncertainty by adjusting adopted strategies
over time.31 In most instances, virtually all agency attention and
resources are directed at the initial decision, regardless of how little
information there is to make the decision.32 Once an initial decision is
made, whether regarding an individual project or an entire program,
the agency rarely revisits it in any systematic way to adjust the
decision or learn from its successes or limitations for future actions.33
In this sense, natural resource decision making reflects a static, frontend approach to resource regulation and management.

26. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 64.
27. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale,
Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 201 (2002).
28. Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in
Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 324–25 (2007).
29. See MGMT. SYS. INT’L, AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE’S NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM 20
(2008), available at http://www.fws.gov/refuges/policiesandbudget/independentEval.html
(“[O]nly 11% of refuge managers surveyed described the current level of inventory and
monitoring work as being mostly or fully sufficient.”); Biber, supra note 25 (manuscript at
40–49) (detailing substantial agency incentives to not carry out ambient monitoring);
Camacho, supra note 28, at 324–28; Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 28–29 (1997).
30. Camacho, supra note 28, at 332–35.
31. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 37–38; Freeman, supra note 29, at 16–17.
32. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 38; Camacho, supra note 28, at 324; Karkkainen,
supra note 27, at 200–01.
33. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 38; Camacho, supra note 28, at 324.
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Many scholars in the legal and scientific literature have called for
the use of “adaptive management” protocols that seek to account for
new information or changes in circumstances through persistent
monitoring, assessment, and adjustment of resource management
decisions.34 Concurrently, a growing number of natural resource
agencies have adopted these experimental strategies.35 Adaptive
management was developed precisely to help resource managers deal
with uncertainty in the regulatory process.36 Ideally, through adaptive
management government officials can act using the limited data they
initially possess (rather than wait to act until such data is certain) with
the knowledge that the strategy can be changed later as more
information becomes available or conditions change.37 Adaptive
management can also be employed to assess background assumptions
such as a reliance on historical conditions as a baseline for projecting
future trends.38 As a result, scholars and agencies increasingly endorse

34. For scientific literature, see, for example, GEORGE H. STANKEY ET AL., U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES: THEORY,
CONCEPTS, AND MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS 31–33 (2005), available at
www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw_gtr654.pdf; CARL WALTERS, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF
RENEWABLE RESOURCES 257 (1986); C.S. Holling, The Spruce Budworm/ForestManagement Problem, in ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND
MANAGEMENT 143, 156 (C.S. Holling ed., 1978). For legal scholarship encouraging
integration of ongoing monitoring and adaptation in regulation, see, for example, Michael
C. Dorf & Charles E. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 267, 285 (1998); Freeman, supra note 29, at 28–29; Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New
Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to
Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 496 (2004).
35. See, e.g., Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat
Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242,
35,252 (June 1, 2000) (detailing U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration guidance requiring adaptive management strategies under
the Endangered Species Act for certain habitat conservation plans (“HCPs”)). See
generally BYRON K. WILLIAMS ET AL., ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORKING GRP., ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE (2009),
available at http://www.doi.gov/initiatives/AdaptiveManagement/TechGuide/opening
pgs.pdf (adopting policy guidance for the Department of the Interior seeking
incorporation of adaptive management “into pertinent internal programmatic guidance”
to be considered for use in certain situations).
36. WALTERS, supra note 34, at 257; Camacho, supra note 24, at 23; Holling, supra
note 34, at 156.
37. See Joseph Arvai et al., Adaptive Management of the Global Climate Problem:
Bridging the Gap Between Climate Research and Climate Policy, 78 CLIMATIC CHANGE
217, 219 (2006).
38. See Linda A. Joyce et al., National Forests, in PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF
ADAPTATION OPTIONS FOR CLIMATE-SENSITIVE ECOSYSTEMS AND RESOURCES 19, 47
(Susan Herrod Julius & Jordan M. West eds., 2008) [hereinafter ADAPTATION OPTIONS],
available at http://downloads.climatescience.gov/sap/sap4-4/sap4-4-final-report-all.pdf.
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the incorporation of adaptive management to cope with the
uncertainty likely to arise with climate change.39
Nonetheless, to date most attempts to use adaptive management
fail to require or encourage resource managers to learn from their
management decisions.40 Many such adaptive management
experiments have failed to provide agency officials with significant
resources or other incentives to implement monitoring and adaptive
management.41 A number of adaptive management programs have
failed to provide clear objectives for experiments to be assessed
against, or specific criteria or triggers for when strategies must be
adjusted to reflect new information or changed circumstances.42
Monitoring of past decisions is usually required, but often deficient.43
Even programs that claim to promote the use of adaptive
management rarely require it, and when adaptive management is
incorporated into an initial regulatory decision actual subsequent
adjustment of that strategy is even less common.44
Perhaps more important than gathering and integrating
information about background conditions and the actual
environmental effects of adopted strategies, these regulatory
programs do not require the collection and assimilation of
information about the efficacy of adopted regulatory strategies,
program processes, or the agency as a whole at achieving the
39. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., RISING TO THE URGENT CHALLENGE:
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR RESPONDING TO ACCELERATING CLIMATE CHANGE 15–17
(2010), available at http://www.fws.gov/home/climatechange/pdf/CCStrategicPlan.pdf
(incorporating adaptive management into a framework for addressing climate change); J.
Michael Scott et al., National Wildlife Refuges, in ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 38,
at ch. 5, 37; Emma L. Tompkins & W. Neil Adger, Does Adaptive Management of Natural
Resources Enhance Resilience to Climate Change?, ECOLOGY & SOC’Y (Dec. 2004),
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art10/main.html.
40. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 40–42, 47–48 (noting, among other examples, that
“USFWS does not systematically collect or assess information about HCPs to allow or
direct agency personnel to learn about the relative value of different negotiating,
monitoring, and management strategies”).
41. See R. Gregory et al., Deconstructing Adaptive Management: Criteria for
Applications to Environmental Management, 16 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 2411, 2413
(2006) (noting that a lack of institutional support can make applying adaptive
management very difficult); Scott et al., supra note 39, at 29.
42. See Dave Owen, Law, Environmental Dynamism, Reliability: The Rise and Fall of
CALFED, 37 ENVTL. L. 1145, 1199 (2007); Lawrence Susskind et al., Collaborative
Planning and Adaptive Management in Glen Canyon: A Cautionary Tale, 35 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 35–38 (2010).
43. See Camacho, supra note 28, at 324–28.
44. See id. at 332–35; Owen, supra note 42, at 1199, 1204 (indicating that though
CALFED purported to use adaptive management practices and was deemed exemplary at
its outset, it failed to sustain enduring adaptive management).
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program’s goals.45 They do not systematically direct or otherwise urge
agency officials to learn about the relative value of different
management strategies46 or provide such officials ready access to the
experience of similarly situated officials in the same or other
agencies.47 As a consequence, conventional regulatory programs and
existing regulatory experiments typically do not systematically gather
information about the performance of previously adopted strategies
or assess whether such strategies or programs have been effective at
achieving stated goals.48
In essence, existing natural resources law has failed to establish
any systemic capacity to manage or reduce uncertainty through
learning. The absence of a framework for gathering and using
information pertinent to the regulatory process results in weak
agency accountability, as not only the agency but also Congress,
stakeholders, and the public have limited credible information to use
to promote changes that make management strategies more
effective.49 More significantly in the context of climate change, this
lack of information about management practices compounds the
substantial uncertainty that agencies confront in managing natural
systems that are changing in unpredictable ways. Natural resources
law needs to develop a comprehensive framework that encourages
agencies to manage and reduce uncertainty about changing natural
systems and the regulatory programs that they employ.
2. Fragmentation and Intergovernmental Information Sharing
Existing regulatory fragmentation (with, at best, weak
coordination among authorities) also hinders agency adaptation and
fails to promote inter-jurisdictional information sharing that can
promote learning and help regulatory authorities manage uncertainty.
Natural systems in the United States are generally subject to a
patchwork of piecemeal and overlapping management, divided based,
45. See Alejandro E. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture: Learning About Ecosystem
Management from the Glen Canyon Dam Experiment, 8 NEV. L.J. 942, 955–56 (2008).
46. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 29; Camacho, supra note 28, at 336–42; Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits in Environmental
Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1442 (2008) (stating that inadequate information about
environmental conditions, regulatory strategies, and agency performance has contributed
to the failure of certain regulatory experiments).
47. See, e.g., Camacho, supra note 28, at 341; Karkkainen, supra note 34, at 495
(“[R]esponsibility for negotiating HCPs and enforcing their terms was a responsibility
assigned to regional and field offices, each operating largely by its own lights.”).
48. See Camacho, supra note 28, at 341.
49. See Camacho, supra note 45, at 957.
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among other things, on (1) the protected resource or resource feature,
(2) the level of government, (3) the branch of government, and (4)
the regulatory stage.50 The existing natural resources management
system in the United States was not designed with climate change in
mind, or for landscape-wide shifts in climate across jurisdictional
boundaries. Rather, it was designed under the paradigm of allowing a
wide range of different regulatory authorities to each manage a set of
narrow and discrete, but often overlapping, resource problems.51
Though such decentralized regulatory authority allows for the
possibility of innovation and inter-jurisdictional learning,52 currently
regulatory authorities neither have the incentives nor genuine
opportunities to learn from other similarly situated resource
managers. Not only do such authorities lack relevant information,
they also lack the capacity to obtain such information. The absence of
such an information infrastructure is a recipe for disaster with the
onset of global climate change, which is likely to increase the
possibility of resource scarcity and conflict, the interaction of
jurisdictions, and the potential for regulatory overlap between
regulatory authorities.
a.

Fragmentation and Climate Change

Existing fragmented governance inhibits not only agency action
addressing the effects of climate change but also the capacity for
inter-jurisdictional learning that can help reduce uncertainty. Other
scholars have detailed how agency inaction can be a detrimental
consequence of regulatory fragmentation for large-scale, diffuse
resource issues.53 Climate change adaptation serves as a good
example of such a “regulatory commons.”54 Though climate change’s
causes and effects are well recognized, they extend across a wide
number and range of jurisdictions.55 As a result of their limited

50. See William W. Buzbee, The Regulatory Fragmentation Continuum, Westway and
The Challenges of Regional Growth, 21 J.L. & POL. 323, 342–48 (2005).
51. See generally Camacho, supra note 24 (discussing regulatory fragmentation in
natural resources governance).
52. See infra notes 78–82 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive
Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59,
61–64 (2010) (discussing agencies’ reticence to take on complex problems that cannot be
adequately addressed under the jurisdiction of a single agency).
54. William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 13–14, 23 (2003).
55. See Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change, Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water
Triage, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 825, 828–31, 861 (2008).
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jurisdiction, most agencies with regulatory authority over natural
resources have little incentive to engage in adaptation planning and
management activities or even to develop the capacity to do so.56
In addition, uncoordinated fragmentation severely limits the
capacity for agency learning, further exacerbating the enormous
uncertainty agencies face from climate change. In the current U.S.
natural resources management system, regulators and managers do
not have the ability to tap into and learn readily from the strategies or
analyses developed by other agency divisions or agencies (in part
because such data is not generated and in part because it is not
broadly accessible).57 This lack of information about the efficacy of
potential management strategies combines with the limited data on
the localized effects of climate change to make many government
authorities conclude that they lack the capacity to engage in
productive adaptation planning.58
Unfortunately, agency officials often choose to focus their energy
on more immediate, well-defined concerns than the more nebulous
and difficult problems of climate change.59 Numerous government
reports have conceded that the United States is unprepared to
manage the effects of climate change.60 Though some resource
56. See Buzbee, supra note 54, at 30–36 (discussing the high information costs, status
quo biases, limited agency credit for being proactive, and the risk aversion of regulators in
a fragmented regulatory setting); Camacho, supra note 24, at 27–28 (suggesting these
conditions exist for adaptation planning).
57. See, e.g., Camacho, supra note 28, at 341 (“[T]here is no comprehensive network
to facilitate the dissemination of . . . information in other than a haphazard, and likely
inefficient, way. . . . [N]egotiation and implementation are conducted by regional and field
offices without any centralized or even decentralized coordination. Moreover, the high
turnover of [U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service] staff exacerbates this fragmentation problem
by further limiting the ability to draw on prior experience. As such, there is, at best,
limited cross-pollination of data . . . and certainly far less than could occur.”) (footnotes
omitted); Karkkainen, supra note 34, at 495.
58. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-863, CLIMATE
CHANGE: AGENCIES SHOULD DEVELOP GUIDANCE FOR ADDRESSING THE EFFECTS ON
FEDERAL LAND AND WATER RESOURCES 155–67 (2007) [hereinafter GAO REPORT
2007], available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d07863.pdf (conveying comments by various
officials regarding their agencies’ limited capacity to respond to climate change); Peter
Kareiva et al., Synthesis and Conclusions, in ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 38, at ch.
9, 30–31 (discussing opportunities to positively address climate change based on
“management policies and procedures”).
59. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 29.
60. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-113, CLIMATE
CHANGE ADAPTATION: STRATEGIC FEDERAL PLANNING COULD HELP GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS MAKE MORE INFORMED DECISIONS 31 (2009) [hereinafter GAO REPORT
2009], available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d10113.pdf; GAO REPORT 2007, supra note 58,
at 156; THE WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, PROGRESS REPORT OF THE
INTERAGENCY CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION TASK FORCE: RECOMMENDED
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agencies are planning and even rolling out adaptation plans,61 such
activities are still limited in development, number, and scope.62
Today, very few natural resources management activities consider the
effects of climate change, and those that do generally concentrate on
proposing additional research or information gathering.63
b.

Problems with Centralization Proposals

One solution commonly offered to address the incentives toward
inaction caused by regulatory fragmentation is the consolidation of
decision-making authority in fewer and/or more central institutions.64
A centralization strategy might provide for oversight or substantive
review of an agency’s activities by a more centralized regulator or for
the limited consolidation of a few programs.65 More extensive
consolidation strategies might include federal preemption of state
authority or a comprehensive reallocation or restructuring of
management responsibility.66 Two examples of more fundamental
consolidation include proposals to integrate federal intelligence
gathering and the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security.67
In the United States, few have focused on the appropriate
allocation of regulatory power among governmental authorities in the
context of climate change adaptation. To the extent that such
ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF A NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION STRATEGY 14
(2010) [hereinafter INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/Interagency-Climate-ChangeAdaptation-Progress-Report.pdf; JOEL B. SMITH ET AL., PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: A CALL FOR FEDERAL LEADERSHIP 2
(2010),
available
at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/adaptation-federalleadership.pdf; Parry et al., supra note 9, at 19–20.
61. See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 60, at 22.
62. See GAO REPORT 2009, supra note 60, at 5; SMITH ET AL., supra note 60, at 2.
63. See GAO REPORT 2009, supra note 60, at 6; see also id. at 3 (referencing routine
use of strategies based on historically normal conditions despite recognition of the
inaccuracy of such assumptions under projected climate change scenarios). Additionally,
even those with knowledge of climate change were often unable to apply such knowledge
to particular settings. See id. at 37–38.
64. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 54, at 49–51; Matthew D. Fortney, Devolving Control
over Mildly Contaminated Property: The Local Cleanup Program, 100 NW. U. L. REV.
1863, 1896–1905 (2006).
65. See Buzbee, supra note 54, at 51.
66. Daniel A. Farber, Climate Adaptation and Federalism: Mapping the Issues, 1 SAN
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 259, 265 (2009).
67. See generally Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence:
Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655 (2006)
(outlining the reorganization of the intelligence community and discussing the need to find
a balance between consolidation and duplication of agency tasks).
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questions arise in the academic literature on climate change, the
commentary has almost exclusively focused on issues of federalism
and climate change mitigation. In this setting, numerous scholars have
discussed whether the federal government should have primacy and
preempt state regulation of greenhouse gases.68 Yet only a few have
discussed such questions in the context of adaptation.69 In addition,
though the federal-state relationship is an important one in
determining the appropriate allocation of authority for managing
natural resources and adapting to climate change, it is not, of course,
solely a federalism issue. That is, it is not just a question of the
relationship between national and state governments; it is also a
question that implicates the allocation of power between federal
agencies, local governments, other national governments, and within
agencies. However, virtually no scholars or governmental bodies have
discussed this broader question.
One of the few proposals in Congress to implicitly address the
federal-state relationship in the context of climate change adaptation
offered a partial integration of adaptation planning power in the
hands of a central federal authority. The Waxman-Markey American
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (“ACES”)70 proposed the
creation of a White House-chaired Natural Resources Climate
Change Adaptation Panel that would include the heads of virtually all
federal natural resource agencies.71 ACES tasked this panel with
establishing an integrated Natural Resources Climate Change
Adaptation Strategy.72 Each federal natural resource agency would be
required to adopt an adaptation plan determined by the president to
68. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, State Greenhouse Gas Regulation, Federal Climate
Change Legislation, and the Preemption Sword, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L.
23, 25 (2009); Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 290 (2003); Alexandra B. Klass, State Innovation and
Preemption: Lessons from State Climate Change Efforts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1653, 1653–
55 (2008); Daniel P. Schramm, A Federal Midwife: Assisting the States in the Birth of a
National Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Program, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 61, 65 (2008);
Jared Snyder & Jonathan Binder, The Changing Climate of Cooperative Federalism: The
Dynamic Role of the States in a National Strategy to Combat Climate Change, 27 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 231, 251 (2009).
69. See Farber, supra note 66, at 259; Robert L. Glicksman, Climate Change
Adaptation: A Collective Action Perspective on Federalism Considerations, 40 ENVTL. L.
1159, 1159 (2010).
70. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
Though this bill was passed by the House of Representatives, it was never adopted by the
Senate. See H.R. 2454: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2454 (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
71. H.R. 2454 § 475.
72. § 476.
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be consistent with the strategy.73 To receive federal funding for
adaptation, states would have to submit an adaptation plan to the
secretary of the interior for certification that the plan is consistent
with all goals, priorities, and standards established by the panel and in
the strategy.74 Such a proposal would substantially increase
centralized oversight and control over federal and state natural
resources management.
Though the consolidation or centralization of authority may
make sense in some instances to minimize inefficiencies,75 a close
integration of government institutions has the potential to
substantially inhibit the many advantages of decentralized decision
making. Few scholars have discussed how to allocate regulatory
power in formulating adaptation strategies, but the broader literature
on federalism and intersystemic governance remains quite relevant.
Many commenters have detailed the disadvantages of consolidating
or centralizing regulatory authority.76 Many have noted that
decentralized regulation provides the opportunity for the provision of
a range of strategies, thus promoting regulatory experimentation and
opportunities for regulators and the public to learn about the relative
efficacy of different strategies.77
In addition, scholars argue that overlapping jurisdiction can
counteract the potential for agency capture and groupthink,78
promote the integration of various specialized subject matter

73. § 478(a).
74. § 479(b).
75. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental
Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 147 (2005) (stating that consolidation of research
and information gathering authority at the federal level would be more efficient in
situations where “local research into health effects, safe exposure thresholds, and potential
control strategies could be duplicative”).
76. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1811–13
(2008); Buzbee, supra note 50, at 324–25, 359–61; Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 53, at 70–
71, 103; Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal
Courts, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1409, 1416–17 (1999).
77. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Environmental
Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF
FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 277, 290 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) (contending that
“adaptive federalism simultaneously sustains competitive legislation and administrative
processes that promote the refinement of policies . . . and processes that produce a diverse
range of policy options”); Adelman & Engel, supra note 76, at 1847–48.
78. See IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK 9 (1972) (defining groupthink as
“[a] mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive
in-group, when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to
realistically appraise alternative courses of action”).
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competencies, and harness agency competition to develop more
effective regulatory outcomes than coordinated authority.79
Overlapping authority can also promote agency accountability by
harnessing other regulators to monitor compliance and the
effectiveness of adopted strategies.80 As a result, many modern
normative models of federalism and intersystemic governance assert
that decentralized and overlapping authority is vital to cultivating
regulatory experimentation, diversity, and effectiveness.81 The
challenge is fostering these benefits of decentralized governance
while minimizing any collective action problems.82
Particularly in the context of climate change mitigation, many
scholars have emphasized the benefits of overlapping state and
federal authority in regulating greenhouse gases.83 Yet even more
than for mitigation, natural resources law and climate change
adaptation can fit well in the overlapping, decentralized governance
model promoted by the adaptive federalism literature. Projecting the
local effects of climate change and developing adaptation strategies to
address these involves substantially more uncertainty than only
projecting atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases with and
without regulation.84 As a result, the innovation-promoting features
of decentralized governance, which can provide substantial
opportunities for regulatory experimentation to reduce uncertainty,
could be particularly valuable for natural resource adaptation. In
addition, because the effects of climate change are likely to differ
considerably by location and resource, the need for specialized
regulation tailored to particular conditions rather than a uniform
standard or cap is substantially greater in the adaptation context.
Concurrently, because anthropogenic climate change is transforming
ecological processes, accelerating change, and spurring ecological
migration, it increases the interaction of jurisdictions and the extent
79. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 67–68; O’Connell, supra note 67, at 1676–77;
Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 290
(2005).
80. See Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 178–79 (2006).
81. See, e.g., id.; see also Snyder & Binder, supra note 68, at 252 (“Certain
redundancies that result from an overlapping cooperative federalism approach are actually
desirable.”).
82. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 77, at 285.
83. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 76, at 1846–49 (discussing the benefits of
California imposing auto emission standards in excess of what the federal Clean Air Act
requires); Carlson, supra note 68, at 310–11 (same); Engel, supra note 80, at 159–62
(same).
84. See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text.
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of regulatory overlap among government authorities.85 This ecological
change and consequent increased blurring and shifting of regulatory
problems makes the argument for primarily localized control less
persuasive. Indeed, at least one scholar has promoted a reliance on
overlapping regulatory authority in the context of adaptation.86
In short, climate change makes it even more difficult to identify a
single appropriate regulatory scale for managing natural resources.
Yet, this is precisely what makes an overlapping, decentralized
governance model such a great match for natural resources law and
climate change adaptation. Designed correctly, a federal natural
resources system can help encourage innovation, account for both
environmental and regulatory diversity, and promote more effective
resource management by providing the opportunity for interjurisdictional information sharing. However, in general, existing U.S.
natural resources governance is poorly designed to promote these
potential benefits.
c.

Problems with Regional Collaboration Proposals

To best accommodate the competing objectives of promoting
innovation and learning while minimizing inefficient and ineffectual
resource management, the most common response has been to create
venues for promoting collaborative decision making. Rather than
consolidation or additional centralized agency oversight, many
scholars and agencies have backed the creation of networks for
interagency collaboration and coordination,87 often focused around
85. See Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural
Resource Law Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 208–10 (2010). For
example, regulatory conflict is likely to occur if the Bureau of Land Management
(“BLM”), consistent with its stated goals that prioritize consumptive economic land uses,
decides to introduce a nonnative species that is well adapted to new climate conditions
onto BLM lands, and that species spreads to a nearby federal wildlife refuge and causes
harm to other species in contravention with U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”)
authority over federal wildlife refuges. See id.
86. See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of
Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 429 (2010) (“[W]hile it may appear inefficient to
have several agencies at different scales working away on some mutual adaptation policy
problem, the built-in redundancy of Dynamic Federalism can provide significant benefits.
It gives the overall system of governance more rather than less policy space, which surely
will be needed for climate change adaptation.”).
87. See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER: THE
PRACTICE AND THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP 1–18 (1998); U.S. CLIMATE
CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM & THE SUBCOMM. ON GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH,
PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF ADAPTATION OPTIONS FOR CLIMATE-SENSITIVE
ECOSYSTEMS AND RESOURCES 7–60 (2008), available at http://www.climatescience.gov/
Library/sap/sap4-4/final-report/sap4-4-final-report-all.pdf; Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 53,
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particular ecosystems or landscapes.88 Such proposals seek to
minimize the negative features of decentralized regulatory authority
by providing additional opportunities for communication and
synchronization rather than through consolidating decision making
authority. As a result, regional regulatory networks are now quite
common in American natural resources management.89 In fact, the
primary federal initiative directed at studying and considering how to
plan for the effects of climate change relies on a collaborative federal
agency network.90
However, these proposals do not really address the core
challenge of reducing and managing uncertainty. Unfortunately, most
inter-jurisdictional government assemblages fail to sufficiently
commit to promoting information sharing, providing opportunities for
collaboration, or otherwise increasing opportunities for intergovernmental learning. Resource managers have limited information
and tools for obtaining, organizing, and accessing information on
their own office’s decisions91 and typically lack access to the data or
strategies of other regional offices or agencies.92 Though regional
collaborations could be set up to provide such an infrastructure, they
rarely focus on doing so. Instead, such programs merely add more
layers of regulation to the already considerable fragmentation in
natural resources management.93 As a result, even regulators
interested in developing adaptation strategies have difficulty
obtaining useful information about the collective management
experience regarding the performance of adopted management
strategies.94 When combined with the considerable uncertainty that
exists regarding possible climate change effects, the information gaps
that exist about the efficacy of past strategies leave regulators with
at 112–16.
88. See, e.g., R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management?, 8
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27, 29–31 (1994); Karkkainen, supra note 46, at 1439–42.
89. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 26–27.
90. See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 60, at 9. The Interagency
Climate Change Adaptation Task Force, which includes over twenty federal government
agencies, was created to provide proposals on adaptation planning for federal agencies.
The task force serves as a venue for federal agencies, working with state and local
authorities, to communicate, brainstorm, and collaboratively develop recommendations
for the president on potential federal adaptation strategies. Id.
91. See Adler, supra note 75, at 165–66.
92. See Camacho, supra note 28, at 341 (noting that this is true of FWS employees
negotiating HCPs, and that the problem is exacerbated by high staff turnover at FWS);
Karkkainen, supra note 34, at 496.
93. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 26–28.
94. See id. at 29.
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limited capacity to manage uncertainty that is necessary for effective
climate change adaptation.95 Natural resources thus continue to
remain susceptible to regulatory procrastination.
II. THE WEAK ADAPTIVE CAPACITY OF NATURAL RESOURCE
GOALS
Many natural resources laws are also poorly suited to foster
effective adaptation because they prioritize preservationism and
minimizing human interaction with natural systems. This
understanding is incongruent with the dynamic nature of ecosystems
and the pervasiveness of the human-nature relationship, particularly
in light of modern anthropogenic climate changes. Future climatic
changes are likely to make the discrepancy between these legal goals
and the dynamic, integrated natural environment increasingly
apparent. In fact, climate change is likely to set minimal management
and preservationist goals against each other.
A. A Focus on Shielding Nature and Historical Preservation
Much of natural resources law and policy is grounded in
preservation and restoration to a historical baseline.96 Many existing
legal goals focus on promoting ecological inertia or restoration of an
ecological system to an earlier state.97 Many natural resource
managers also regularly focus on promoting the preservation or
restoration of existing or past ecological conditions, typically to a preEuropean settlement baseline.98
The less prevalent version of this preservationist approach
stresses shielding nature from active human intervention, thus
keeping ecological systems in (or returning them to) a “natural”
95. See Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five
Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 58–60 (2010).
96. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 205–07; see also NAT’L PARK SERV.,
MANAGEMENT POLICIES § 4.1 (2006) [hereinafter NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES],
available at http://www.fws.gov/policy/manuals/ (“[P]reserving park resources and values
unimpaired is the core or primary responsibility of NPS managers.”); U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., SERVICE MANUAL 601 FW 3.15C [hereinafter FWS SERVICE
MANUAL], available at http://www.fws.gov/policy/601fw3.html (“We do not allow refuge
uses or management practices that result in the maintenance of non-native plant
communities unless we determine there is no feasible alternative . . . . ”).
97. See, e.g., National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (stating a
purpose of “conserv[ing] the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life
therein . . . unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”).
98. See A. Starker Leopold et al., Wildlife Management in the National Parks, in
TRANSACTIONS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH NORTH AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES CONFERENCE 29, 29–44 (James B. Trefethen ed., 1963).

CAMACHO.BKI

2011]

5/5/2011 12:57 PM

NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

1427

state.99 Such an approach is epitomized by the federal Wilderness Act,
which focuses on protecting areas designated as “wilderness,” defined
as:
an area where the earth and its community of life are
untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does
not remain[;] . . . an area of underdeveloped Federal land
retaining its primeval character and influence, without
permanent improvements or human habitation, which is
protected and managed so as to preserve its natural conditions
and which (1) generally appears to have been affected primarily
by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man’s work
substantially unnoticeable . . . .100
Such areas are not principally protected for their ecological value
or even to preserve the historical condition of the ecosystem. The Act
requires federal agencies to manage such areas “in such manner as
will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as
wilderness, and so as to provide for the protection of these areas,
[and] the preservation of their wilderness character . . . .”101
Accordingly, though wilderness areas may “contain ecological,
geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or
historical value,”102 they are above all protected because they are wild
and minimally influenced or disturbed by human activity.103
Preservation of the wild character of certain lands has intrinsic
value104 and/or provides humans spiritual,105 psychic,106 scientific,107
99. See, e.g., BILL MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE 47 (2006) (noting the inherent
human desire to maintain “pristine places, places substantially unaltered by man”).
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2006).
101. § 1131(a); see also § 1131(c) (stating a wilderness area must be “protected and
managed so as to preserve its natural conditions . . . .”); cf. Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“[T]he Wilderness Act
requires that the lands and waters duly designated as wilderness must be left untouched,
untrammeled, and unaltered by commerce.”); High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1133 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (concluding that manmade river
structures did not “further the goals of the Wilderness Act”); Sierra Club v. Lyng, 662 F.
Supp. 40, 42–43 (D.D.C. 1987) (placing the burden of proof on the secretary of agriculture
when enacting measures that “contravene wilderness values guaranteed by the Wilderness
Act”).
102. § 1131(c).
103. See, e.g., LINDA H. GRABER, WILDERNESS AS SACRED SPACE 11 (1976); JACK
TURNER, THE ABSTRACT WILD 120 (1996).
104. See, e.g., Reed Noss, Wilderness Recovery, in THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS
DEBATE 521, 525–26 (J. Baird Callicott & Michael P. Nelson eds., 1998) (“Some people,
for reasons quite beyond the rational, believe that huge, wild areas are valuable for their
own sake.”).
105. See, e.g., RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, WILDERNESS & THE AMERICAN MIND 157
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economic,108 and existence109 benefits. This perspective relies on a
human-nature dualism110 in which wild natural landscapes are
accepted as normatively good111 in contrast with the interference of
active human management.112
The more pervasive version of preservation in natural resources
law is essentially antiquarian, emphasizing the minimization of the
nonnative and the preservation or restoration of preexisting
ecological communities with reference to a historical benchmark.113
Many modern conservation and public land laws and management
policies are premised on protecting biota that preexisted European
settlement and inhibiting those that did not.114 For example, virtually
all state and federal invasive species laws, regulations, and agency
policies that regulate the intentional and inadvertent movement of
species are premised on the distinction between native and
nonnative.115 “Invasive” under federal law includes as a necessary
(4th ed. 2001) (“[A]t a time when the force of religion seemed vitiated by the new
scientism on the one hand and social conflict on the other, wilderness acquired special
significance as a resuscitator of faith.”); John Copeland Nagle, The Spiritual Values of
Wilderness, 35 ENVTL. L. 955, 979–84 (2005) (documenting the substantial weight given in
congressional hearings on the Wilderness Act to the spiritual value of wilderness).
106. See William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness, or, Getting Back to the Wrong
Nature, in THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE, supra note 104, at 471, 483.
107. CHRIS MASER, THE REDESIGNED FOREST 174 (1988) (asserting that untouched
nature provides ecologists an invaluable template to learn from, for the restoration of
damaged ecosystems).
108. See Jan G. Laitos & Rachael B. Gamble, The Problem with Wilderness, 32 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 503, 511–12 (2008) (“[L]ow-impact recreationists who want to access
wilderness account for some of the $300 billion in annual retail sales for gear, food,
lodging, entertainment, and transportation associated with recreating in America’s
outdoors. Non-motorized outdoor recreation pumps $730 billion into the United States
economy annually, and supports about 6.5 million jobs.”).
109. See, e.g., John V. Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 777,
781 (1967); Laitos & Gamble, supra note 108, at 510.
110. See MCKIBBEN, supra note 99, at 48 (describing dualism and the idea of nature as
“the separate and wild province, the world apart from man”).
111. See HOLMES ROLSTON, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: DUTIES TO AND VALUES IN
THE NATURAL WORLD 238 (1988) (“If we come to a landscape on its own terms, sensitive
to its integrity, wild is always a positive predicate.”); Michael McCloskey, Changing Views
of What the Wilderness System Is All About, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 369, 375 (1999).
112. See ROBERT ELLIOT, FAKING NATURE: THE ETHICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
RESTORATION 79 (1997); Eric Katz, The Ethical Significance of Human Intervention in
Nature, 9 RESTORATION & MGMT. NOTES 90, 92 (1991) (“Depending on the adequacy of
our technology, . . . restored and redesigned natural areas will appear more or less natural,
but they will never be natural—they will be anthropocentrically designed human
artifacts.”).
113. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 231.
114. Id. at 218.
115. See, e.g., NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra 96, § 4.4.1.3; FWS SERVICE
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prerequisite that the species is nonnative,116 so that destructive native
species are not considered invasive.117 Likewise, on virtually all
federal lands there is a strong presumption in favor of avoiding,
limiting, and removing exotic species.118
To varying degrees, most federal conservation and land
management laws and agencies also emphasize protecting preexisting
biotic communities. The National Park Service Organic Act requires
the National Park Service (“NPS”) “to conserve the scenery and the
natural and historic objects and the wild life therein . . . as will leave
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”119 This
preservation goal mandates that the NPS cannot approve an action if
it could lead to the impairment of any preexisting resources or values

MANUAL, supra note 96, at 701 FW 1.4B (classifying indigenous species as those
“[o]riginating in and being produced, growing, or living in a particular region or
environment”).
116. Proclamation No. 13,112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183, 6183 (Feb. 3, 1999); NAT’L INVASIVE
SPECIES COUNCIL, MANAGEMENT PLAN: MEETING THE INVASIVE SPECIES CHALLENGE
2 (2001), available at http://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/docs/council/mpfinal.pdf
(characterizing invasive as “a species that is . . . non-native (or alien) to the ecosystem
under consideration and . . . whose introduction causes or is likely to cause economic or
environmental harm or harm to human[, animal, or plant] health”); U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC., NATIONAL STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR INVASIVE SPECIES
MANAGEMENT 1 (Lynn Starr ed., 2004), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/invasive
species/documents/Final_National_Strategy_100804.pdf.
117. See, e.g., NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, INVASIVE SPECIES DEFINITION
CLARIFICATION AND GUIDANCE WHITE PAPER 3 (2006), available at http://www.doi.gov/
NISC/global/ISAC/ISAC_documents/ISAC%20Definititions%20White%20Paper%20%2
0-%20FINAL%20VERSION.pdf (“While non-migratory populations can cause problems,
they are not considered an invasive species because they are native.”).
118. See, e.g., NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 96, § 4.4.4.2 (“All exotic plant
and animal species that are not maintained to meet an identified park purpose will be
managed—up to and including eradication.”); U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF
LAND MANAGEMENT MANUAL § 1745.06(A) (1992) [hereinafter BLM MANUAL] (stating
that native species shall be used in any introduction, transplant, restocking, and
reestablishment activity unless various stringent requirements are met); id. § 1745.06(H)
(“In designated wilderness areas, . . . [e]xotics shall not be introduced.”); U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., REFUGE MANUAL pt. 7, § 8.1 (1982) [hereinafter FWS REFUGE
SYSTEM MANUAL] (“The continued existence, or management of exotic plants and
animals on refuge lands will be permitted only if: [i] An exotic species has become
established and its elimination, while desirable, is no longer practicable, or [ii] An exotic
species has become established and maintained on a non-augmented basis for at least 25
years and does not conflict with refuge objectives.”); FWS SERVICE MANUAL, supra note
96, at 601 FW 3.15(C) (“We do not allow refuge uses or management practices that result
in the maintenance of non-native plant communities unless we determine there is no
feasible alternative.”); U.S. FOREST SERV., FOREST SERVICE MANUAL § 2323.34c(1)
(2007) [hereinafter USFS MANUAL], available at http://www.fs.fed.us/im/directives/
dughtml/fsm.html (“Do not stock exotic species of fish in wilderness.”); id. § 2323.33a.
119. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
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of a national park.120 Similarly, the federal Endangered Species Act is
predominantly concerned with only protecting native endangered or
threatened species within their historical range;121 other implementing
regulations or policies for protecting rare species focus on native
species as well.122 In managing federal wildlife refuges under the
National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act (“NWRSIA”),123
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) emphasizes preserving
and restoring native species’ populations and habitats124 to “historic
conditions.”125 Management regulations implementing the Wilderness
Act promote protecting or restoring native populations and natural
processes.126 Even though lands managed by the Bureau of Land
Management (“BLM”) and the U.S. Forest Service were initially
established to be managed for use rather than preservation, they

120. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 96, § 4.1 (“[P]reserving park resources
and values unimpaired is the core or primary responsibility of NPS managers.”); see also
id. § 4.4.2.2 (“Service will strive to restore extirpated native plant and animal species.”); id.
§ 4.4.1 (“The National Park Service will maintain as parts of the natural ecosystems of
parks all plants and animals native to park ecosystems.”); id. § 4.4.1.2 (“The Service will
strive to protect the full range of genetic types (genotypes) of native plant and animal
populations in the parks by perpetuating natural evolutionary processes and minimizing
human interference with evolving genetic diversity.”); id. § 4.4.2.5 (“In altered plant
communities managed for a specified purpose, plantings will consist of species that are
native to the park or that are historically appropriate for the period or event
commemorated.”).
121. A number of state endangered species laws also refuse to extend protection under
their endangered species acts to nonnative species. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 17-296
(LexisNexis 2008); FLA. STAT. § 379.2291 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 503.584(2)(a) (2010);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-331(2) (2009).
122. See, e.g., NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 96, § 4.4.2.3 (“The Service will
survey for, protect, and strive to recover all species native to national park system units
that are listed under the [ESA]. . . . [T]he Service will inventory other native species that
are of special management concern to parks . . . and will manage them to maintain their
natural distribution and abundance.”).
123. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006).
124. See, e.g., FWS REFUGE SYSTEM MANUAL, supra note 118, at pt. 7, § 8.1; id. at pt.
7, § 12.2.; FWS SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 96, at 601 FW 3.10B(1) (“The System’s
focus is on native species and natural communities such as those found under historic
conditions.”); id. at 601 FW 1.9A (“The overarching goal of the Refuge System is to
conserve a diversity of fish, wildlife, and plants and their habitats . . . with a focus on native
species.”).
125. FWS SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 96, at 601 FW 3.12; id. at 601 FW 3.6D
(defining historic conditions as “[c]omposition, structure, and functioning of ecosystems
resulting from natural processes that we believe, based on sound professional judgment,
were present prior to substantial human related changes to the landscape”).
126. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 96, § 6.3.7; BLM MANUAL, supra note
118, § 1745.06(H).
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nonetheless consider their central conservation objective to be
sustaining and enhancing native ecological systems and species.127
Indeed, the primary strategy of natural resources management—
the reserve model of conservation128—is largely premised on
preserving preexisting resources in certain areas and keeping or
removing all others.129 By tying resource conservation to such a
historical baseline, this preservationist approach to natural resources
management treats nature as not only relatively fixed but also
context-specific.130
B.

Climate Change and the End of Preservation

Though there may be a variety of shortcomings with existing
natural resources law in the United States, it nonetheless has been at
least moderately effective at maintaining natural resources that under
the reserve model have been set aside. This is in large part because,
until recently, ecological change has been relatively slow since the
onset of modern natural resources law. However, the onset of global
anthropogenic climate change makes it increasingly apparent that the
human-nature dualist and preservationist goals of natural resources

127. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(b) (2009) (“The overall goal of the ecological element of
sustainability is to provide a framework to contribute to sustaining native ecological
systems . . . .”); BLM MANUAL, supra note 118, § 1745.02 (stating as the first two
objectives of the BLM’s policy on introductions: “(1) Ensure that management of native,
naturalized and exotic species enhances, restores, and does not reduce the biological and
genetic diversity of natural ecosystems” and “(2) Ensure that the introduction of exotic
species is ecologically sound and will not adversely impact natural ecosystems”); USFS
MANUAL, supra note 118, § 2070.2 (seeking to promote the “use of native plant materials
in revegetation, rehabilitation, and restoration of both aquatic and terrestrial
ecosystems”).
128. See, e.g., Terry L. Erwin, An Evolutionary Basis for Conservation Strategies, 253
SCIENCE 750, 750 (1991) (“National parks, wildlife refuges, biosphere reserves, military
reserves, Indian reservations, and other forms of legally protected areas have been
established for aesthetic, political, or practical purposes in the last 150 years.”); C.R.
Margules & R.L. Pressey, Systematic Conservation Planning, 405 NATURE 243, 243 (2000);
Rahel et al., supra note 12, at 552.
129. Cf. Holly Doremus, The Endangered Species Act: Static Law Meets Dynamic
World, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 205–06 (2010) (stating that traditional conservation
strategies, including preserves, “assume[] that what nature needs most is for people to
leave it alone”).
130. See, e.g., YI-FU TUAN, SPACE AND PLACE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF EXPERIENCE 6
(1977); Holmes Rolston III, Environmental Ethics: Values in and Duties to the Natural
World, in ECOLOGY, ECONOMICS, ETHICS: THE BROKEN CIRCLE 73, 86 (F. Herbert
Bormann & Stephen R. Kellert eds., 1991) (“A species is what it is where it is.”); Daniel
R. Williams et al., Beyond the Commodity Metaphor: Examining Emotional and Symbolic
Attachment to Place, 14 LEISURE SCI. 29, 31 (1992) (examining sense of place and place
attachment to wilderness areas).
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law are incongruent with the interconnectedness of human and
natural systems and existing knowledge about ecological dynamics.
Climate change thus reveals the limits of both of these models of
American natural resources law and accelerates the need to depart
from them.
1. The Questionable Benefit of Avoiding Human Management
First, climate change makes it quite apparent that any attempt to
protect nature as untouched is belated and artificial. Of course, many
have argued that the goal of quarantining nature from humanity is an
illusory one131 in light of the historical extent of human effects on
what are considered natural ecological systems.132 Yet, human
influence on ecological systems is even more pervasive as a result of
anthropogenic climate change in addition to other human-induced
stressors.133 If maintaining the human-nature dichotomy embodied by
laws like the Wilderness Act was ever an attainable goal,134 it certainly
is not now.135
131. MATHIS WACKERNAGEL & WILLIAM REES, OUR ECOLOGICAL FOOTPRINT:
REDUCING HUMAN IMPACT ON THE EARTH 4 (1996) (“[T]he human enterprise cannot be
separated from the natural world even in our minds because there is no such separation in
nature.”); J.B. Ruhl, The Pardy-Ruhl Dialogue on Ecosystem Management, Part IV:
Narrowing and Sharpening the Questions, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 25, 30–31 (2007)
(arguing that “naturalness” and the “natural/unnatural dichotomy” are human constructs
and subjective).
132. See STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, NATURE’S KEEPERS: THE NEW SCIENCE OF NATURE
MANAGEMENT 103–11 (1995) (detailing how repeated burnings by pre-Columbian human
populations shaped what we now consider to be American flora and fauna); William
Tucker, Is Nature Too Good for Us?, in TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON
CONTROVERSIAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 34, 42 (Theodore D. Goldfarb ed., 4th ed.
1991) (“Wilderness today means the land after the Indians have been cleared away but
before the settlers have arrived.”).
133. See DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 194 (1990) (“[T]here is no longer any part of the Earth that is
untouched by our actions in some way . . . .”); Robert R.M. Verchick, Steinbeck’s Holism:
Science, Literature, and Environmental Law, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 16 (2003) (“[E]very
ecological system on the planet has been touched by human conduct, directly or indirectly,
whether by genetic manipulation, air and water pollution, climate change, or farming.”);
Jonathan Baert Wiener, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1,
12 (1996).
134. But see G. Stanley Kane, Restoration or Preservation? Reflections on a Clash of
Environmental Philosophies, in BEYOND PRESERVATION: RESTORING AND INVENTING
LANDSCAPES 69, 70 (A. Dwight Baldwin, Jr. et al. eds., 1994) (asserting that because
“humans are systematically excluded” from wilderness areas, wilderness areas are “the
most astonishingly unnatural places on earth”).
135. See, e.g., Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological
Science on American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 870 (1994) (“The
accelerating interaction between humans and the natural environment makes it impossible
to return to an ideal state of nature.”).
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At this point, virtually any adaptation strategy would have a
considerable effect on ecological systems. In fact, given the extensive
already-present human-induced barriers to the migration of biota to
adjust to climate change,136 even the choice to not act to adapt to the
effects of climate change would substantially affect ecological
systems. As a result, choosing not to affect ecosystems may simply be
impossible. Furthermore, climate change raises the ecological costs of
relying only on passive management with the goal of keeping less
disturbed areas “wild.” As reserved areas progressively decline and
degrade from the combined effects of anthropogenic climatic change
or other human activities, any activity to ameliorate such effects
would increasingly obscure any human-nature divide. To maintain the
“wildness” goal, managers would have to accept substantially
impaired ecosystems as climatic changes ravage existing reserves. Of
course, the election to not actively manage does not mean an
ecosystem will be undisturbed by human activity—global climate
change ensures this will not be so. As a result, climate change more
fundamentally calls into question what the benefit is of isolating a
land reserve and barring its active management to maintain or
increase ecological function.
2. The Increasing Infeasibility of Preservation
Of course, rather than doing nothing, another option for dealing
with the effects of climate change might be to actively manage to
ensure that ecological conditions on the reserved land do not change
substantially from current and/or past conditions. Such an objective
would be consistent with the other preservationist strand of natural
resources law that seeks to maintain ecological conditions at a
historical baseline.137 However, such strategies would be
fundamentally at odds with existing knowledge about ecological
dynamics, particularly in light of the swift and substantial effects of
global climate change.
136. See Malcolm L. Hunter, Jr., The Biological Landscape, in CREATING A
FORESTRY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE SCIENCE OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 57, 62
(Kathryn A. Kohm & Jerry F. Franklin eds., 1997) (explaining how highways and fences
can impede dispersal of even large animals); Brian Lavendel, Ecological Restoration in the
Face of Global Climate Change: Obstacles and Initiatives, 21 ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION
199, 202 (2003) (“Current habitat fragmentation patterns and human barriers may prevent
range shifts.”); see also Emma Marris, Moving on Assisted Migration, 2 NATURE REP. 112,
113 (2008), available at http://www.nature.com/climate/2008/0809/pdf/climate.2008.86.pdf
(“Humans have dominated the landscape to such an extent that natural dispersal cannot
take place in many areas.”).
137. See supra Part II.A.
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The historical preservation goal in existing natural resources law
largely reflects an antiquated equilibrium model of ecology that
stresses the natural stability of ecosystems.138 However, this model has
been widely discredited in ecological science as failing to reflect the
complexity and dynamism of ecosystems.139 Accordingly, the
continued regulatory focus on maintaining or restoring ecosystem
constituents for the principal reason that they previously existed at
the site attempts to impose stasis on ecological communities that
otherwise would change over time. Any attempt to preserve or
restore to a historical baseline based on the notion that doing so
somehow serves to conserve ecosystems in a single fixed and
objectively natural state is incompatible with prevailing ecological
knowledge. The embedded division between native and nonnative
species in laws, regulations, and management policies on invasive
species, public lands, and endangered species simply reflects a myopic
view of ecology and evolution.
Despite being based on an erroneous understanding of ecological
stasis, before climate change began, natural resources law and
management were nonetheless able to reasonably approximate
historical conditions. To be sure, defining an original baseline when
ecosystems are perpetually in flux is difficult if not impossible.140 Yet
until recently most ecological change fell within a fairly limited range
of variability.141 In light of the convulsive effects of climate change,
however, accomplishing historical preservation or restoration goals
becomes at best increasingly costly and perhaps even impossible.
Many ecologists have concluded that climate change is likely to stress
ecosystems at a rate and to an extent that is outside the range of

138. See Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, as They Apply to
Environmental Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 893 (1994).
139. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial
Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1122–23 (1994) (“[T]he
equilibrium paradigm has been rejected in ecology and replaced with a complex, stochastic
nonequilibrium one.”).
140. See Donald Worster, Nature and the Disorder of History, in REINVENTING
NATURE 65, 143 (Michael E. Soulé & Gary Lease eds., 1995) (“[A]ny serious attempt to
define the original state of a community or ecosystem leads to a logical and scientific
maze.”).
141. The “stationarity” model that is dominant in modern ecology and gaining
momentum in natural resources management is still premised on “the idea that natural
systems fluctuate within an unchanging envelope of variability.” P.C.D. Milly et al.,
Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319 SCIENCE 573, 573 (2008). Though
this model may recognize that ecosystem conditions are in flux, it depends on the
assumption that any variability in ecosystems is bounded. See Ruhl, supra note 86, at 393.
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historical variability, pressuring biotic assemblages and communities
to transform in fundamental ways.142
In such circumstances, climate change will require increasingly
active human management to maintain preservation goals that will be
progressively more costly and perhaps impossible to meet for some
ecosystems. In fact, reserved lands may become inhospitable to and
fundamentally incompatible with the very resources they were
established to protect.143 At the same time, the value of preserving an
ecosystem in its historical condition becomes increasingly
questionable. Historical ecological preservation or restoration still
may provide important scientific, educational, and cultural benefits in
particular cases.144 However, such value will have to be weighed
against the potential loss of ecological function that comes with (1)
actively cultivating resources that might be increasingly incompatible
with climatic conditions and (2) actively preventing the arrival of
other biological resources that otherwise would immigrate to the
reserve. Climate change ensures that in many cases there will be
escalating ecological and other costs, and diminishing gains from
engaging in ecosystem preservation and restoration.
Finally, by making ecological preservation and restoration
increasingly an active management enterprise, global anthropogenic
climate change pits the historical preservation goal against the goal of
avoiding human management of ecological systems. In the past, such
goals may have been in tension with each other, as at least passive
management would be needed to keep preserved areas as they are.
Yet at least the reserve model of cordoning off and isolating resource
lands was theoretically congruent with both keeping nature as it is
and leaving it alone. In the context of climate change, resource
managers may choose to not manage ecological systems, leaving
reserved areas to rearrange as climatic changes occur. Alternatively,
managers could choose to actively manage the reserve to ensure that

142. See, e.g., Parmesan, supra note 9, at 643–44 (discussing phenological changes due
to climate change); Parry et al., supra note 9, at 10–12 (projecting with very high
confidence increased harm to coastal and freshwater resources); Rahel et al., supra note
12, at 557 (“Climate changes . . . may cause environmental conditions to exceed the
historic range of variability to which species are adapted.”); Ryan et al., supra note 11, at
96–97 (projecting greater disturbance to forests from fire, pestilence, and disease).
143. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 247.
144. See, e.g., Stephen T. Jackson & Richard J. Hobbs, Ecological Restoration in the
Light of Ecological History, 325 SCIENCE 567, 568 (2009) (asserting that even with global
climate change, historical restoration will provide useful data about ecosystems and the
effectiveness of management responses to disruptions).
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it maintains similar ecological conditions as in the past. However,
they will not be able to do both.145
In fact, as global climatic changes exert increasing pressure on
biota in a wide range of ecosystems to adapt, the primary goal should
neither be preventing natural resources management strategies from
affecting natural systems nor avoiding a departure of ecological
conditions from a historical norm. At best, both avoiding human
management and actively managing ecosystems to maintain historical
conditions would be increasingly costly, yet provide diminishing and
questionable benefits given projected climate changes. Consequently,
neither shielding nature from human interference nor the active
management of reserve lands to maintain historical conditions are
likely to be viable goals for adapting natural resources to the effects
of climate change. Rather, natural resources management must be
principally directed at anticipating future climatic conditions,
developing mechanisms for assessing the value of potential ecological
components and processes, weighing tradeoffs between such potential
components and processes, and minimizing the detrimental and
maximizing the beneficial consequences from management strategies
and other human activities on natural systems.146
III. A SYNERGISTIC PROMOTION OF STASIS
Though both existing management processes and the objectives
of natural resources law in the United States provide distinct
limitations on the capacity of natural resources management to adapt
to the effects of climate change, they are interconnected and mutually
reinforcing in a number of ways. Of course, the central theme that
links the static view of nature enshrined in natural resources law and
the prevalent rigid model of regulatory decision making together is
that both are premised on promoting stasis and stability.147 Existing
natural resources law is based on static or fixed models of nature and
decision making—both the ends to which natural resources should be
managed and the means through which government institutions and
the public more generally learn and decide. In general, administrative
145. Cf. Cronon, supra note 106, at 485 (“To the extent that biological diversity
(indeed, even wilderness itself) is likely to survive in the future only by the most vigilant
and self-conscious management of the ecosystems that sustain it, the ideology of
wilderness is potentially in direct conflict with the very thing it encourages us to protect.”).
146. Wiener, supra note 133, at 14 (“Change is inevitable, and what matters is not the
false choice of preservation versus change, but the real choice of which changes are benign
and which are adverse.”).
147. See supra Part II.A.
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law continues to task natural resource agencies with providing frontend, comprehensive, and conclusive strategies for managing what are
typically very complex systems and problems about which there
regularly is incomplete information.148
This model based on stasis is the result of a longstanding and
pervasive emphasis on an understanding of law as an attempt to
provide certainty and stability through legal rules.149 Indeed, courts
and Congress have incorporated this emphasis on certainty into the
conventional administrative law rulemaking process, which only
allows subsequent adjustments to adopted rules through engaging in
the lengthy and costly rulemaking process yet again.150 Such a step at
most, occurs sporadically over a rule’s lifetime. To be sure, over the
past few decades proponents of adaptive management have
increasingly emphasized a more nuanced approach that encourages
agencies to constantly review, reevaluate, and, if necessary, change
their decisions in order to adapt to changing circumstances or
improve ineffective policy.151 However, a fundamental and yet
unresolved tension remains between the competing goals of providing
certainty through front-end decision making and the need for
provisionalism in light of limited information and changes in
148. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 37–38.
149. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (1977) (identifying
“introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action by
them” as one of the eight major ways that a legal system may be misused); B.E. WITKIN,
CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, at Appeal § 481, at 541 (5th ed. 2008) (noting that stare decisis
“is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability, and stability in the law are the
major objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their
conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of
law”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997) (identifying “stability” as the third of five elements that
constitute the Rule of Law); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 214–15 (1979) (“Laws should be
relatively stable. They should not be changed too often. If they are frequently changed
people will find it difficult to find out what the law is at any given moment and will be
constantly in fear that the law has been changed since they last learnt what it was.”);
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989).
150. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006); Paralyzed Veterans of
Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“To allow an agency to make
a fundamental change in its interpretation of a substantive regulation without notice and
comment obviously would undermine [the] APA requirements.”); Nat’l Family Planning
& Reprod. Health Ass’n, Inc. v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that
agencies cannot create new constructions of rules that substantially alter their meaning
without undergoing notice and comment rulemaking).
151. See J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95
MINN. L. REV. 424, 428–29, 438 (2010) (“The legal view of a resource management plan is
that it comprehensively evaluates all rational considerations at once and then flips a toggle
switch; the adaptive management approach twiddles the dial as information trickles in.”).
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circumstances that inevitably arise in the regulatory process.152
Though there are encouraging signs that some courts recognize the
need for provisionalism and seek to accommodate the need for
adaptive management, courts continue to reject elements of adaptive
management plans that allow subsequent adjustment when not
expressly allowed under enabling statutes or underlying regulations.153
Furthermore, because of budget constraints, lack of accountability,
and other disincentives, government officials often have limited
interest in the persistent monitoring and subsequent adjustment of
decisions in furtherance of program goals that learning requires.154 In
short, existing natural resources management and the administrative
law that governs it remain premised on a fairly static, front-end model
of decision making.
Yet as detailed earlier, existing scientific knowledge makes quite
evident that natural systems are far from static,155 and the adaptive
management literature suggests that regulatory decision making need
not be either.156 Existing natural resource legal processes and goals
simply do not reflect how natural systems are complex adaptive
systems or how information is effectively obtained.157 In the past, the
conventional static model may have had substantial advantages. Such
a clear bright-line mandate for resource conservation could serve to
counteract political opposition from focused economic interests
during implementation.158 Furthermore, the costs of relying on a
152. See id. at 443–44. Ruhl and Fischman noted that as of May 2010 there were thirtyone federal court decisions struggling with the legality of adaptive management, and that
the government had lost more than half of them. Id. at 444–45. However, at least some
courts are not categorically rejecting adaptive management approaches; in particular,
adaptive management programs that rely on large-scale plans that tie site-specific adaptive
components to data in larger cumulative studies and contain their adaptive elements
within the outer bounds of the legally required substantive management criteria have been
successful. See id. at 445.
153. See id.
154. See, e.g., Camacho, supra note 24, at 29, 38; Camacho, supra note 28, at 327–29.
Another constraint on agencies is that many natural resources laws assign agencies the
duty to observe and manage ecological systems based on a human time scale that is very
compressed. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 233. This myopia is reinforced by a
representative democratic system that relies on two-, four-, or six-year election cycles,
focusing attention on short-term baselines and overlooking longer-term shifts.
155. See supra notes 8–16 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text.
157. See Karkkainen, supra note 27, at 196–97 (“[W]e have constructed an architecture
of laws and management systems that are poorly matched to the challenge of managing
ecosystems as complex dynamic systems.”).
158. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 245–46 (stating that a bright-line historical
baseline has the advantage of simplicity and serving as a shield from intense political
pressure); Holly Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change Through Law that Bends Without
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historical baseline are likely to be more modest, as there is less need
for expensive post-decision monitoring of ambient effects or the
adjustment of decisions to account for changed conditions.159 Though
decisions in conventional natural resources management undoubtedly
were subject to uncertainty and involved assessments of dynamic
ecological conditions, such uncertainty and ecological change was
relatively bounded. Accordingly, though assessments made for initial
management decisions were perhaps crude, there nonetheless were
plausible reasons for treating protected lands as static in the past.
However, those reasons are significantly less persuasive as a
result of global anthropogenic climate change. Climate change
threatens to make static preservationism very difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve.160 As such, if the conservation objectives of
natural resources law are not changed from a preservationist focus,
climate change threatens to make law and conservation seem futile.161
Perhaps more importantly, continuing to manage based solely on an
initial determination grounded in limited information makes little
sense, particularly in the context of natural resource adaptation in
which uncertainty is considerable. Similarly, failing to monitor for
changes in background conditions and take advantage of the
opportunity to gain new information about the performance of
adopted strategies would almost certainly prove costly and lead to
ineffective management. Accordingly, as an accelerant of change and
promoter of uncertainty, climate change makes the rigidity that exists
in natural resources law particularly evident and unsustainable.
The substantive and procedural limitations of existing natural
resources governance also depend on each other in a number of ways,
and their joint incompatibility with climate change further reinforces
the need for a departure from such static regulatory goals and
processes. First, the static model of nature promoted by the historical
preservationism goal serves to fortify natural resources law’s
unadaptive model of regulation. The prevailing front-end,
comprehensive rationality approach embedded in natural resources
Breaking, 2 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 9),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1628255 (stating environmental law traditionally
relied on a number of uncompromising conservation precommitments that would buttress
conservation goals in the face of political pressure).
159. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 940 (2002)
(“Mandatory postdecision monitoring is not without its disadvantages, the most obvious of
which is cost. Monitoring is not free.”).
160. See supra Part I.A.
161. See Craig, supra note 95, at 33–35.
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regulatory decision making assumes and relies on a presumption that
conditions are not likely to change significantly after the initial
decision.162 Because historical preservationism has similarly presumed
that ecological conditions do not change significantly, it has served to
reinforce a reliance on a front-end, static regulatory process.
However, this justification for rigid regulatory decision making
becomes significantly weaker once one accepts that natural systems
are likely to change over time.
Second, the static understanding of nature assumed by a
historical preservationist goal is also congruent with the regulatory
segmentation currently prevalent in American natural resources
governance.163 Because of the inherent mutability and mobility of
ecosystems and their constituents, a historical preservation goal could
only be possible if lands subject to such an objective were segmented
and treated as independent from others. Regulatory segmentation by
definition allows different types of lands to be segmented and thus
more easily treated as distinct from or unconnected to others. In this
sense, existing regulatory fragmentation is in part a symptom of
historical preservation goals.
Climate change makes obvious, however, that biota will need to
change or shift to accommodate climatic shifts or face extinction.164 A
fragmented system is likely to be particularly inadequate at managing
the broad, landscape-scale transformations expected from climate
change. For many species on reserve lands, changes in climate
conditions will make existing protected ranges unsuitable as habitats,
necessitating a shift in range165 often from one jurisdiction to another
(e.g., from public to private land, from state to federal land, or from
162. See Karkkainen, supra note 27, at 200–01.
163. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., O. Hoegh-Guldberg et al., Assisted Colonization and Rapid Climate
Change, 321 SCIENCE 345, 345 (2008) (“Rapid climatic change has already caused changes
to the distributions of many plants and animals, leading to severe range contractions and
the extinction of some species.”); Parry et al., supra note 9, at 11 (“The resilience of many
ecosystems is likely to be exceeded this century by an unprecedented combination of
climate change, associated disturbances . . . and other global change drivers . . . .”);
Thompson Webb III, Past Changes in Vegetation and Climate: Lessons for the Future, in
GLOBAL WARMING AND BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 13, at 59, 60 (“[I]t is likely
many plant species will be unable to move their ranges rapidly enough to keep up with
such a rapidly shifting climate . . . .”).
165. See Parry et al., supra note 9, at 11 (projecting that twenty to thirty percent of
species will face an “increased” risk of extinction if average global temperatures rise more
than 1.5 to 2.5 degrees Celsius). A leading but often contested article in Nature concluded
that, by 2050, up to two-thirds of species will need to migrate or be moved to new habitats
to survive. See Chris D. Thomas et al., Extinction Risk from Climate Change, 427 NATURE
145, 146 (2004).
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federal BLM land to federal wilderness areas). In addition to both
topographical and human-induced physical dispersal barriers, many
such range shifts will be hindered by differences in management
between jurisdictions. Regulatory conflict is also likely to occur
between place-based preservationist laws (e.g., those governing
national parks management)166 and species-focused preservationist
laws (e.g., endangered species laws).167 If a member of a listed
endangered species migrates into a national park outside its historical
range, such movement might place preservationist national park
management (perhaps even requiring removal) in conflict with such
federal or state endangered species law. In addition, a member of an
endangered species that attempts to migrate into areas outside its
historical range might be considered nonnative and potentially
invasive under federal or state invasive species laws.
As a result of climate change, then, regulatory segmentation in
natural resources law is likely to lead to increased conflict between
inconsistent management objectives. At a minimum, such goals will
have to be reconciled, and management coordinated, to limit
unintended detrimental effects of management of each area on the
others. Yet, the acceptance that biota may need to adapt to climatic
changes by shifting their range to other landscapes necessitates a
departure not only from a purely segmented focus, but also from
historical preservationism. If natural resources management
continues to require the maintenance of historical conditions as
regulatory fragmentation combines with other environmental and
human-induced stressors to hinder species migrations, managers will
have to accept that ecological systems will continue to decline in
ecological diversity and function.168
Third, like its historical preservationist counterpart, the humannature dualism embedded in wilderness preservation has also
influenced and contributed to regulatory segmentation by facilitating
and promoting the severance of human-shaped landscapes from
“natural” landscapes. In this sense, segmentation is needed to achieve
not only the bifurcation between native and nonnative, but also the

166. See National Park Service Organic Acts, Pub. L. No. 64-235, 39 Stat. 535 (1916)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1–4 (2006)).
167. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 17-296 (LexisNexis 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-2-105.5 (2009); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 379.231 (2011); FLA. STAT. § 379.2291 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-807
(LexisNexis 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. § 503.584(2)(a) (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-331(2)
(2009).
168. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 247.
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human and nature dualism. To accommodate the goal of keeping
humans out of pristine areas, natural resources law created areas
where human activities and nonnative species are acceptable and
prevalent, and others where they are to be prevented, minimized, or
their effects mitigated. This dichotomy places human-dominated
landscapes such as agricultural, suburban, and urban lands on one
side, and reserve lands subject to a wilderness mandate on the
other.169 Because this division focuses on the extent of human
influence, it is perhaps unsurprising that in man-made and other
human-dominated environments, the law allows extensive human
interference to deal with and manage change without controversy.
Adaptations to prepare for or reduce the effects of climate change
that involve changes in urban infrastructure or crop selection are
accepted, while active management such as assisted migration170 is
much more contentious for “natural,” less disturbed landscapes.
In enabling this severance, the human-nature dualism facilitated
problems in natural resources management. In particular, the
bifurcation advanced by a human-nature dualism makes it easier to
disregard or forget that human-dominated landscapes and less
disturbed lands massively influence each other. Segmentation of lands
might have helped much of the public see a division between human
activities on the one hand and their effects on natural systems on the
other.171 Aldo Leopold argued that such segmentation essentially
allowed reserved lands to serve as an excuse for failing to rectify or

169. Of course, human influence pervades even reserved lands, so a range of human
uses exist on reserved public lands as well. As a result, currently there is more of a
continuum of public lands, which range from the more disturbed (such as BLM grazing or
mining lands) to less manipulated areas (such as federal wilderness).
170. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 211–13.
171. Cf. Cronon, supra note 106, at 484–85 (“[T]o the extent that we live in an urbanindustrial civilization but at the same time pretend to ourselves that our real home is in the
wilderness, to just that extent we give ourselves permission to evade responsibility for the
lives we actually lead. We inhabit civilization while holding some part of ourselves—what
we imagine to be the most precious part—aloof from its entanglements. We work our
nine-to-five jobs in its institutions, we eat its food, we drive its cars (not least to reach the
wilderness), we benefit from the intricate and all too invisible networks with which it
shelters us, all the while pretending that these things are not an essential part of who we
are. By imagining that our true home is in the wilderness, we forgive ourselves the homes
we actually inhabit.”); Ramachandra Guha, Radical American Environmentalism and
Wilderness Preservation: A Third World Critique, in THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS
DEBATE, supra note 104, at 231, 239 (“[In the United States] the enjoyment of nature is an
integral part of the consumer society. The private automobile (and the life style it has
spawned) is in many respects the ultimate ecological villain, and an untouched wilderness
the prototype of ecological harmony; yet, for most Americans it is perfectly consistent to
drive a thousand miles to spend a holiday in a national park.”).
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improve the management of human-dominated landscapes.172 More
importantly, even if natural resource managers acknowledge that
natural and human systems are inextricably connected, regulatory
segmentation makes it considerably more difficult to address. Though
there are many factors exogenous to land reserves that affect them,
the segmentation model fostered by dualism raises significant barriers
for natural resource managers to address these effects.
Finally, the lack of procedural flexibility and the substantive
emphasis on preservationism in natural resources law both function
to devolve significant control of decision making to natural resource
managers. First, by not imposing requirements and providing
incentives to natural resource managers to monitor, revisit, and adjust
decisions publicly, existing natural resources law makes it difficult for
such agencies to be reviewed and evaluated by legislatures, other
administrative bodies, or members of the general public.173 Not
requiring agencies to learn also makes such public decisionmakers
less accountable to the public.174
In addition, because a historical preservationist model
fundamentally relies on a scientific evaluation of current or past
conditions for the normative determination of what future conditions
should be, it treats natural resources management as a scientific,
expert-driven analysis. A natural resources management goal
tethered to a historical baseline treats what currently exists (or
historically existed) as what should exist in the future. In this sense,
historical preservationism converts ecology into a normative
172. See Aldo Leopold, Land-Use and Democracy, AUDUBON, Sept.–Oct. 1942, at 259,
reprinted in THE RIVER OF THE MOTHER OF GOD AND OTHER ESSAYS BY ALDO
LEOPOLD 295, 299 (Susan L. Flader & J. Baird Callicot eds., 1991) (“It seems to me that
sanctuaries are akin to monasticism in the dark ages. The world was so wicked it was
better to have islands of decency than none at all. . . . Once established, these islands
became an alibi for lack of private reform. People said: ‘We pay the bills for all this virtue.
Let goodness stay where it belongs, and not pester practical folks who have to run the
world.’ . . . The more monasteries or sanctuaries, the grimmer the incongruity between
inside and outside.”).
173. See Biber, supra note 25, at 45–47 (describing how monitoring data can provide
courts with an independent empirical basis for closer review of agency decisions).
174. See Camacho, supra note 28, at 343–44 (“[S]ubjecting program implementation to
ongoing, open monitoring and evaluation . . . serves to curb opportunities for bias. . . . By
providing an open framework for evaluating a regulatory program, adaptive regulation
can enlist the public and Congress to help the regulatory process evolve.”); Michael C.
Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 267, 288, 321 (1998) (asserting that public participation in regulator performance
evaluation can increase the accountability of regulatory institutions); Jody Freeman, The
Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 549, 638, 663–66 (2000)
(arguing that including private actors in the regulatory process can foster accountability).
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science.175 As a result, a historical preservation management goal
makes the scientific determination of existing or past conditions the
primary management question. It thus serves to treat natural
resources management as the primary province of ecologists and
resource managers. Together with the diminished accountability that
arises from the prevailing weakness of public monitoring and
adaptive management, preservationism has enabled natural resources
management to rely heavily on an ostensibly expert-driven model of
administrative regulation. As detailed below, this focus on expertise
to determine management goals will undoubtedly need to be
reformulated for natural resources law to effectively work to help
ecological systems and natural resources law itself adapt to the rapid
and accelerating effects of a changing climate.
IV. MAKING NATURAL RESOURCES LAW MORE ADAPTABLE
Because the substantive and procedural shortcomings of natural
resources law detailed above have been mutually reinforcing, the
alterations necessary to make natural resources management more
effective are likely to be linked as well. Natural resources law must be
modified to be better adapted to a dynamic world. Both the means
and the ends of natural resources management must be changed to
better prepare for the effects of climate change.
As I have argued elsewhere,176 natural resources law needs to
move more toward a model of active management that is not
primarily motivated by a fidelity to past conditions. Rather than
leaving nature alone, or putting things the way they were, natural
resources laws must be refocused toward promoting desirable future
ecological conditions in light of climatic changes. Managers and
regulators must be charged with protecting and promoting the fitness
and resilience of valuable ecosystem processes, instead of focusing on
particular preexisting species or collections of species. Management
goals must be oriented toward facilitating the development of new
valuable biotic interactions rather than hindering them based on
devotion to the past. This reorientation would often seek to promote
175. Cf. Mark Sagoff, Native to a Place, or What’s Wrong with Exotic Species?, in
VALUES AT SEA: ETHICS FOR THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 93, 106 (Dorinda G.
Dallmeyer ed., 2003) (“No one can say scientifically that it is better to stand by the native
oyster than to introduce the alien competitor. . . . Biological and ecological science . . .
describes what may happen if nonnative [species] are allowed to prosper in the bay. These
sciences may predict but cannot evaluate the consequences. Ecology should not attempt to
become a normative science.”).
176. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 243–53.
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existing ecological constituents by using past conditions as a guide.
However, its primary focus would not be to revert to historic
conditions but rather to ensure that the ecosystem is healthy under
future conditions. Where such ecological fitness cannot be achieved
through merely passive management, more active approaches should
be considered.
A rejection of the treatment of humans and nature as separate
and distinct does not lead to an unconditional acceptance of the
permissibility of active management of all resource areas. To be sure,
there may be many significant precautionary reasons for not actively
managing reserve areas. Perhaps the most important reason for not
managing reserve areas actively is the substantial uncertainty that
exists regarding the efficacy and unintended effects of human
interventions.177 There are many examples of human interventions
that have had significant adverse and inadvertent effects on ecological
systems,178 and these examples and the increased uncertainty that
accompanies climate change counsel strongly against the wholesale
reliance on active management of ecosystems. Natural resources
management certainly must account for the risks and limited
knowledge regarding potential adaptation strategies in trying to
minimize negative and maximize desirable future change.
However, the advent of climate change also makes clear that
choosing to not employ strategies that promote ecological health on
the basis that doing so will interfere with natural wild areas will
increasingly have significant irreparable ecological costs that must be
considered. In all likelihood, there will be many instances in which
passive management strategies will be preferable because of
uncertainties regarding the effects of more active human intervention.
Yet as a result of climate change, there increasingly will be
circumstances in which active management may be warranted to
prevent or minimize substantial losses in ecological health. Of course,
a paradigm shift toward conserving ecological function raises many
difficult questions that remain largely unexplored in natural resources
law. Perhaps the most important of these is that though climate
change reveals that a fidelity to stasis is increasingly untenable, an
177. See id. at 185–86.
178. See, e.g., id. (describing several species introductions that became invasive, such as
certain oyster species and kudzu in the United States and rabbits and cane toads in
Australia); Anthony Ricciardi & Daniel Simberloff, Assisted Colonization Is Not a Viable
Conservation Strategy, 24 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 248, 249–50 (2009) (arguing
that species translocation may have a severe impact on food webs and other ecosystem
attributes).
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alternative, future-focused baseline is still difficult to define.179 Such a
focus opens up the natural resources management process to the
substantially more complex inquiry into the relative value of the
various natural resources under consideration for protection or use.
Even if one limits the management objective solely to maximizing
ecosystem function or health and overlooks other aesthetic,
recreational, economic, and historic considerations, an analysis of
ecological value remains open to a variety of interpretations.
Ecological considerations may be directed toward promoting
biodiversity,180 though there remains a host of different ways to define
and/or measure biodiversity;181 toward maximizing ecosystem
productivity,182 however defined; or even some combination thereof.
In short, there is no universal agreement regarding what ecosystem
health means.
To be sure, just as different public lands in the United States are
subject to a diversity of management goals,183 some reserve lands
179. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 245.
180. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Working Both (Positivist) Ends Toward a New (Pragmatist)
Middle in Environmental Law, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 542 (2000) (reviewing
DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1999)) (“Scientific research suggests that the
concept of biological diversity, or biodiversity, is the key metric of ecosystem health.”).
181. For a discussion of various measures of biodiversity, see Andy Purvis & Andy
Hector, Getting the Measure of Biodiversity, 405 NATURE 212, 212–18 (2000); see also
ANNE E. MAGURRAN, MEASURING BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 9 (2004) (providing an
overview of the primary procedure through which diversity is measured, including
modeling, statistics, and estimation techniques); Brian H. Walker, Biodiversity and
Ecological Redundancy, 6 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 18, 19 (1992) (“Decline in
biodiversity includes all those changes that have to do with reducing or simplifying
biological heterogeneity, from individuals to regions. Included are such phenomena as
phenotypic plasticity; genetic variability within a population (allowing for a wide range of
genotypic responses to environmental conditions); ecotypic variation (genetic variability
between populations within a species); species richness (the number of species in a
community); species (alpha) diversity (involving both the number of species and the
relative numbers of individuals per species); functional diversity (the relative abundances
of functionally different kinds of organisms); gradient (beta) diversity, which extends to
diversity resulting from speciation of ecological equivalents (gamma or delta diversity);
community diversity (the number, sizes, and spatial distribution of communities,
sometimes referred to as patchiness); and even the diversity of the scales of patchiness
(landscape diversity).”).
182. See, e.g., Alyson C. Flournoy et al., Harnessing the Power of Information to Protect
Our Public Natural Resource Legacy, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1575, 1594 (2008).
183. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (establishing the National Park Service’s core
preservation mandate of conserving “the scenery and the natural and historic objects and
the wild life therein . . . as will leave them unimpaired”), and 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136
(2006) (providing the Wilderness Act’s central goal of preserving wilderness areas of
“undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence”), with 16
U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3) (2006) (providing the National Forest Management Act’s mandate
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could be managed to prioritize the promotion of biodiversity while
others could emphasize ecosystem productivity. More broadly,
different lands could focus on promoting other social values such as
recreational, aesthetic, historic, scientific, or economic uses. Indeed,
some reserves could rely on more active management of ecological
areas while others continue to concentrate on more passive
management. This less intrusive approach might be particularly useful
in circumstances in which the ecological area will be fairly
ecologically stable with climate change, is poorly understood, and is
ecologically sensitive. In such circumstances—indeed perhaps in
many circumstances—it might make more sense to leave ecological
systems alone. Resource managers and legislators need to weigh the
possibility, however, that ignoring or barring management of an
ecological community might lead to substantial costs in ecological
diversity and/or productivity.
Just as the goal of promoting future ecological value remains
embryonic, there is also not a developed approach for identifying the
appropriate ecological units resource managers should focus on in
management, prioritization, or making tradeoffs between competing
resource uses or services184 or what role the distributive effects of such
tradeoffs should serve in natural resources management. A key
underlying challenge of relying on a goal that seeks to promote
desired future conditions is that doing so makes natural resources
management more vulnerable to the political pressures often wielded
against natural resource conservation.185 In addition, a focus on
valuing ecosystem services and ecological health is a more
complicated message for coordinating and mobilizing conservation
groups and other diffuse stakeholders than the crude simplicity of
preservationist and dualist goals. As such, concurrent with removing
the strict preservationist baseline, natural resources law must
incorporate other procedural mechanisms that protect conservation
uses over more tangible and easily priced consumptive uses.186
Undoubtedly, scientific data can and must facilitate the
resolution of these and other complicated questions. Managers would

that national forests must be managed for multiple uses, including resource extraction and
timber harvest).
184. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 248–53.
185. See David A. Dana, Existence Value and Federal Preservation Regulation, 28
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 373 (2004).
186. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 158 (manuscript at 25–37) (identifying a number of
substantive and procedural mechanisms to buttress long-term conservation goals in the
face of short-term economic interests).
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need to engage in at least three enterprises: (1) identifying and
reducing uncertainty about projected shifts in climatic and ecological
conditions, (2) identifying and reducing uncertainty about the past
performance and likely effectiveness of possible management
strategies, and (3) assessing the ecological and social value of and
synergy between possible ecological constituents. This substantive
vision of natural resources management would thus still rely on
substantial manager expertise in determining ecological value, but it
would place considerably greater information gathering pressure on
already isolated and information-deprived natural resource managers.
More fundamentally, climate change makes clear that natural
resources management should not be the sole province of ecologists
or other scientific experts. As natural resources law necessarily
becomes untethered to a historical baseline, the key questions raised
regarding the appropriate goals and priorities for managing natural
resources are not answerable exclusively through a scientific,
objective analysis. These value and tradeoff judgments are public
policy decisions and should be resolved though the democratic
process of decision making.187 Though science will be integral to
developing approaches to both understanding ecological systems and
measuring the value of particular components, such tradeoff decisions
are ultimately normative.188
Because this vision of natural resources management is even less
scientific, it emphasizes that natural resources law’s core function
should be improving the process of natural resource decision making.
Natural resources law under climate change has the potential to be a
great fit for overlapping, decentralized governance. Because of the
massive uncertainty regarding the nature and scope of local effects of
climate change,189 it is hard to identify a single appropriate regulatory
scale. Such characteristics fit well with a decision-making model that
relies on multiple overlapping authorities. Overlapping jurisdiction
can provide regulatory redundancy to fill in regulatory gaps and thus
provide resiliency.190 In addition, the existence of many different
187. Cf. Donald Waller, Getting Back to the Right Nature: A Reply to Cronon’s “The
Trouble with Wilderness,” in THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE, supra note 104, at
540, 563 (“Our science will also allow us to critically evaluate what will, and what will not,
suffice to stem the hemorrhage of biodiversity. Science, however, is only a tool whose
success in these efforts will depend utterly on our values.”).
188. Id.
189. See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text.
190. See Engel, supra note 80, at 178; Schapiro, supra note 79, at 290; Biber, supra note
25, at 71. But see O’Connell, supra note 67, at 1679–80 (noting that redundancy raises a
risk of agency freeriding and under-regulation).
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regulatory authorities provides considerable opportunities for
experimentation and interagency learning.191 However, as detailed
earlier, existing natural resources governance is poorly designed to
promote these potential benefits.192 Natural resources law currently
leaves resource managers isolated in addressing uncertain regulatory
problems and fails to pressure regulators to learn.
To address the limitations of existing natural resources
governance, I have previously advocated for the adoption of a crossjurisdictional infrastructure to promote agency learning and
accountability.193 One component of this infrastructure is an adaptive
governance framework that builds on adaptive management theory,
including required monitoring, assessment, and adjustment of all
agency strategies and processes regarding their progress toward
identified regulatory goals.194 Though this framework builds on
adaptive management, it seeks to rely on the integration of
monitoring, assessment, and evaluation throughout the regulatory
process and not only through the use of formal adaptive management.
The express use of adaptive management may be valuable and/or
necessary in some circumstances, but a range of less rigid, rigorous,
and expensive forms of adaptive regulation that mandate and
incentivize agency and stakeholder monitoring, contingency planning,
and periodic adjustment of regulatory decisions could and should be
relied on as well.195 A systematic process of sustained information
collection and periodic alteration of regulatory strategies should
apply throughout the regulatory process, including not only the
assessment of individual resource decisions and management plans,
but also the evaluation of adopted decision processes and agencies
against programmatic goals.196
In addition, this learning infrastructure would include a shared
and public information network that collects and disseminates

191. See Adler, supra note 75, at 137 (“[D]ecentralization, and the resulting policy
experimentation and interjurisdictional competition, can encourage policy innovation as
policymakers seek to meet the economic, environmental, and other demands of their
constituents. As a result of such competition, states are able to learn from each others’
successes and failures. This competition allows states to act as environmental ‘laboratories’
developing new and improved ways of addressing environmental concerns.”) (citations
omitted).
192. See supra Part I.B.
193. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 64–76.
194. Id. at 72–73.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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information between jurisdictions.197 The information network should
include sustained collection and generation of ambient monitoring
data, particularly on climate change effects, the development of
localized models for projecting future effects, and information on
potential adaptation strategies.198 More importantly, it should also
compile data on the past and continued performance of adopted
management strategies in every jurisdiction.
Encouragingly, the White House Interagency Climate Change
Adaptation Task Force has recommended the development of a
federal information clearinghouse and other measures consistent with
developing the information generation and dissemination capacity of
regulators.199 The task force also suggested encouraging ongoing
federal agency prioritization, monitoring, evaluation, and learning to
promote better adaptation planning.200 Congruent with these goals,
the task force recommended the establishment of performance
metrics for evaluating federal adaptation efforts, as well as the
development of partnerships and regional consortia to formulate
adaptation strategies.201 In March 2011, relying on this report, the
White House Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) issued
instructions to all federal agencies to (1) develop a climate change
adaptation policy statement by June 2011 that adopts “the
Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force’s guiding
principles and framework for adaptation planning,” (2) submit to
CEQ an agency climate adaptation plan by June 2012, and (3)
“pursue opportunities for sharing and coordination across the Federal
community.”202 Though these activities primarily focus on federallevel adaptation,203 they nonetheless indicate that the current
administration is at least considering, if not moving toward, the
development of an information infrastructure for managing
uncertainty in climate change adaptation planning and management.
To this end, recently, at least some federal agencies are working
to increase their capacity to collect climate data and create
clearinghouses to distribute scientific information to their regional
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 65–66.
Id. at 66.
See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 60, at 33–34.
See id. at 27–29.
See id. at 49–51.
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING CLIMATE
CHANGE ADAPTATION PLANNING IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER 13514, at
3–5 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/
ADAPTATION%20FINAL%20IMPLEMENTING%20INSTRUCTIONS%203_3.pdf.
203. See id. at 9.
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offices, state agencies, and the public related to climate change
adaptation planning.204 The Department of the Interior, for example,
is in the early stages of identifying and eventually opening eight
regional Climate Science Centers (“CSCs”) and partnering with other
federal agencies, state entities, and interested nongovernment
stakeholders to create Landscape Conservation Cooperatives
(“LCCs”).205 LCC staff will “assist partners in integrating status and
trends data with effectiveness monitoring and applying science-based
monitoring programs to determine if resource goals are being met,
evaluate and adapt management goals and strategies, and work with
CSC staff to reduce key uncertainties and improve the next round of
forecasts.”206 This initiative is still in a very early stage,207 and, like
many other preceding regulatory initiatives, may simply call for the
use of adaptive regulatory approaches and inter-jurisdictional
information sharing without providing clear requirements, sufficient
resources, or any other incentives for continued and sustained
204. See generally PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION: WHAT FEDERAL AGENCIES ARE DOING (2010), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/FederalGovernmentLeadershiponAdaptation_No
v2010.pdf (describing briefly the many actions federal agencies are taking regarding
climate adaptation).
Similarly, the Obama administration continues the recent trend of integrating
adaptive management in its most recent resource management initiatives. For example, in
July 2010 President Obama signed an executive order adopting the final recommendations
of the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force in their entirety. Council on Envtl. Quality,
WHITE
HOUSE,
The
International
Ocean
Policy
Task
Force,
THE
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/oceans (last visited Apr. 28,
2011). They include both adaptive management and monitoring provisions, stating that
“[h]uman activities that may affect ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes ecosystems should be
managed using ecosystem-based management and adaptive management, through an
integrated framework that accounts for the interdependence of the land, air, water, ice,
and the interconnectedness between human populations and these environments,” and
that “[m]anagement should include monitoring and have the flexibility to adapt to
evolving knowledge and understanding, changes in the global environment, and emerging
uses.” THE WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE INTERAGENCY OCEAN POLICY TASK FORCE 16 (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/OPTF_FinalRecs.pdf.
205. Interior’s Plan for a Coordinated, Science-Based Response to Climate Change
Impacts on our Land, Water, and Wildlife Resources, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 1,
http://www.doi.gov/whatwedo/climate/strategy/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&Pag
eID=23288 (last visited Apr. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Interior’s Plan]. For an example of such
an LCC, see generally California Landscape Conservation Cooperative, U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV. (Dec. 2009), http://library.fws.gov/LCC/california.pdf.
206. Interior’s Plan, supra note 205, at 5.
207. Climate Science Centers, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.doi.gov/
whatwedo/climate/strategy/CSC-Map.cfm (last visited Apr. 28, 2011) (indicating that many
of the Climate Science Center sites have not been determined yet and that this process will
continue into the future).
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monitoring, adaptive management, and agency learning.208
Nonetheless, it is encouraging to see that the planning stages call for
extensive information gathering, partnerships between government
and nongovernment actors, and the distribution of data that will
enable stakeholders to adapt their natural resources management
decisions based on frequently updated information.
CONCLUSION
The existing governance system for managing natural resources
in the United States has only a limited capacity to cope with the
effects of climate change because of its reliance on static models of
nature and decision making. Existing natural resources management
institutions are not well suited to foster effective adaptation because
they are unadaptive and fragmented, and thus poorly designed to
cultivate systematic learning and manage uncertainty. This limitation
is related to and exacerbated by a heavy focus in many natural
resources laws on managing resources toward preserving historical
conditions and minimizing human interaction with ecological systems.
The emphases on minimal management and historical preservation
will be increasingly misplaced, and in fact these two goals will be
more and more in direct tension with each other in light of modern
climate changes. Though these weaknesses of natural resources law
existed prior to the development of global anthropogenic climate
change, its onset makes these limitations particularly evident and the
achievement of conventional management goals increasingly
untenable.
The historical preservationist and passive ends of natural
resources law, and the static means through which they are expected
to be achieved, all arise from the legal system’s discomfort with
integrating and managing uncertainty and change. They also depend
on and reinforce each other. Historical preservation’s static model of
nature and the human-nature dualism embedded in wilderness
preservation help reinforce existing regulatory fragmentation and
natural resources law’s unadaptive model of regulation. Reciprocally,
historical preservation would not be possible without wholesale
landscape segmentation. Moreover, a reliance on a historical
ecological baseline, an emphasis on partitioning humans from natural
208. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 47–48 (suggesting a range of tools for promoting
agency and stakeholder learning, including integration in manager performance evaluation
and compensation, financial or other regulatory inducements for regulated entities, and
enlisting stakeholders and outside agencies to buttress monitoring or evaluation).
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systems, and a lack of procedural flexibility in natural resources law
all encourage entrusting natural resource decision making to
presumed expert resource managers. This serves to limit public
understanding of and involvement in resource management decisions.
The solutions to the shortcomings of these two static visions are
thus linked. First, natural resources management must shift its ends
toward promoting an increased emphasis on limiting ecological shifts
or interactions that are likely to be detrimental to the ecological
function and biodiversity of ecological reserves given projected shifts
in climatic conditions, as well as seeking to foster those shifts likely to
be beneficial. Such a change would undoubtedly be fundamental,
away from a simplistic static analysis of whether an ecological
constituent preexisted European settlement as the determining factor
toward an evaluation of the ecological and social significance of that
constituent. This substantive vision of natural resources management
would still rely on substantial manager expertise in determining
ecological value, but places considerably greater informationgathering pressure on already-isolated and information-deprived
natural resource managers.
As a result, fostering an effective shift in natural resource goals
that accommodates the transformative effects of climate change
necessitates a concomitant structural transformation in the natural
resource decision-making process. The means of natural resources
law must be fundamentally altered to better manage uncertainty and
change, to inform and learn from the public about the value of
ecological resources, and to galvanize public deliberation on natural
resource decisions. This includes a regulatory process premised on
promoting stakeholder involvement, cultivating agency and
stakeholder learning, and reducing uncertainty over time. Because
the core normative analysis would necessarily be less expert-driven, it
would shift natural resource managers toward a more mediative
role.209
Such a learning infrastructure would not only serve to cultivate
agency accountability and learning. It would also help increase
information to, and facilitate transparent debate and deliberation
among, stakeholders, legislatures, and the public about the
considerable value of ecological systems, processes, and particular
ecosystem constituents, as well as the tradeoffs of different
management strategies. Moreover, it would promote opportunities
for interjurisdictional information sharing while accommodating the
209. See Camacho, supra note 28, at 352.
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various diversity benefits of overlapping jurisdiction. Finally, this
infrastructure would help provide the framework for establishing
measurable goals and priorities for the active forward-looking
management of natural resources in a changing world. By
transforming a decidedly static governance system to be more
dynamic and adaptive—both in its goals and in how such goals are
advanced—natural resources law can make ecological systems more
resilient and provide some hope that these ecological communities on
which humans are so dependent may be able to sustain the effects of
a rapidly changing climate.

